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This Article critiques the current product safety regime in the United
States and identifies a means for its immediate improvement. Under the
present system, consumers are guarded against defective products by a
two-tiered safety net, comprised offederal regulatory authority and state-
based tort law. However, both tiers of this safety net are flawed, and when
these flaws overlap, consumers are exposed to serious dangers from
defective products. Millions of consumer goods each year fall through
these "holes" in the safety net, with poorly designed handguns being
perhaps the best known example.
Traditional remedies for these flaws-such as remedial federal
legislation, municipal legal action, voluntary standards, and increased
disclosures of information-are ineffective patches for the safety net.
However, the recent confluence of developments in administrative law and
state unfair trade practices law can provide the solution to this problem.
This Article proposes that these developments allow state attorneys
general to promulgate regulations setting product standards for goods that
fall through the current product safety net. The attorneys general can set
these standards immediately, without further legislative authorization, and
thus prevent the harm and injury that stems from the sale of such defective
consumer goods.
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Introduction
Most Americans rest easy under the incorrect assumption that the
products they use are all subject to vigorous federal scrutiny. They
presume that every item, from lawn mowers to cooking implements and
baby toys, is poked, prodded, and tested by one of the numerous federal
agencies that were created to protect the public.
In fact, the actual product safety picture in the United States is quite
different. While several federal agencies have jurisdiction to oversee a
variety of consumer products, they actually regulate comparatively few.
For instance, although over 10,000 consumer products are within the
purview of the federal Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), the
agency has issued only fifteen sets of regulations under the Consumer
Product Safety Act in over 30 years.1 Actual regulation plays a minor role
in the protection of American consumers.
Most products are not covered by existing regulations, but by an
honor system. This system is not based just on the goodwill of the product
manufacturers. It assures compliance by confronting manufacturers with a
two-pronged threat. The first prong is the possibility that the federal
agencies may begin to regulate, and thus restrict, a consumer product
should it establish a bad track record.2 The second prong is the possibility
of crushing tort liability from private suits if products are not made
"reasonably" well. Together, the dual threats of federal regulation
(sometimes executed) and product liability suits have contributed to better
and safer goods for consumers over time.
3
Thus, the federal regulatory power (both existing regulations and the
spectre of future regulation) and the backdrop of tort liability form a two-
I See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201-1211, 1301-1306 (1999). These product safety regulations govern,
respectively, architectural glazing materials, matchbooks, bicycle helmets, citizens band radio
antennae, swimming pool slides, cellulose insulation, cigarette lighters, garage door openers, refuse
bins, extremely flammable contact adhesives, lead paint, consumer patching compounds containing
asbestos, ash and ember containing asbestos, and lawn darts. The CPSC also has promulgated
regulations as directed by other statutes, including the Federal Hazardous Substances Act. See 16
C.F.R. § 1500 (1999) (regulating hazardous substances and establishing safety rules for children's
toys).
2 I. fact, the CPSC has a nationwide surveillance system set up to monitor the products
under its jurisdiction. Via its NEISS network, the CPSC obtains information regarding a statistical
sample of consumer product injuries in the United States and, thus, can determine how best to direct
the agency's limited resources. See generally U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, NATIONAL
ELECTRONIC INJURY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM, SAMPLE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION (1994); see
also Joseph L. Annest et al., National Estimates of Nonfatal Firearm Related Injuries, 273 JAMA
1749 (1995). Similarly, the CPSC also relies on reviews of consumer complaints and other sources of
information to scrutinize developments in the consumer product market. See 15 U.S.C. § 2054(a)(1)
(1994) (requiring the CPSC to maintain an injury information clearinghouse concerning injuries and
deaths caused by consumer products); 16 C.F.R. § 1115 (1999) (regulating information gathering and
maintenance).
3 See The New, Improved CPSC, TRIAL, Sept. 1994, at 22; Playing It Safe, TRIAL, Oct.
1998, at 20.
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tiered safety net for consumer product safety in the United States.
Although the system has worked reasonably well for many products, it is
not without flaws. In addition to the limited number of actual, rather than
potential, product regulations, the first tier of the safety net includes
explicit exemptions that bar federal agencies from even considering
regulating certain products.4 The tort system's effectiveness in promoting
product safety also has limits. It provides less than optimal incentives to
manufacturers regarding product safety design, and for certain types of
products, it provides no real deterrence against the design and production
of defective goods.5 When these flaws in the two tiers of the safety net
align, consumers are left essentially unprotected.
Given the array of products in the American marketplace, this is by
no means a rare occurrence; millions of goods are sold each year that fall
through the product safety net. Firearms provide perhaps the most
recognizable examples. 6 Far too often, firearm manufacturers decline to
make even basic safety modifications and improvements to their goods,
because they are exempted from federal consumer product regulation by
statute7 and tort recoveries historically have eluded most plaintiffs in
handgun tort suits. Although manufacturer Iver Johnson stated in 1894 that
any gun that discharges without the pull of the trigger "is a mechanical
absurdity as well as a constant danger,"8 each year hundreds of injuries
result from that precise flaw.9 Similarly, although federal studies show that
simple childproofing devices could eliminate common handgun injuries to
young children, 10 manufacturers often do not employ such devices." This
remains true more than one hundred years after Smith and Wesson
invented a childproof handgun.12 The current product safety net offers no
meaningful protection from such basic safety risks; it cannot be expected
to prevent future injuries from such defective products.
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(B)-(l) (1994) (exempting tobacco and tobacco products,
motor vehicles, pesticides, firearms, aircraft, most boats, drugs, medical devices, cosmetics, and food
from CPSC regulation).
5 See infra Part II.B.
6 See generally 70 AM. JUR. 2D § 42 & Supp (1996).
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(E).
8 Erik Larson, Wild West Legacy: Ruger Gun Often Fires if Dropped, but Firm Sees No
Need for Recall, WALL ST. J., June 24, 1993, at AI (quoting Iver Johnson).
9 See id.
10 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCIDENTAL SHOOTINGS: MANY DEATHS AND
INJURIES CAUSED BY FIREARMS COULD BE PREVENTED 2-3 (1991).
11 See id. at 33-35; see also Jon S. Vemick et al., '7 Didn't Know the Gun Was Loaded:'An
Examination of Two Safety Devices That Can Reduce the Risk of Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 20 J.
PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 427, 431-33 (1990) (noting long-standing existence of important gun safety
devices that are not widely utilized by many gun manufacturers).
12 See KRISTA D. ROBINSON ET AL., JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. CTR FOR GUN POLICY AND
RESEARCH, PERSONALIZED GUNS: REDUCING GUN DEATH THROUGH DESIGN CHANGES 5 (1995);




Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net
This Article proposes a way to patch the holes in the existing product
safety net without new federal or state legislation and without altering the
tort system. Taken together, recent developments in state "unfair trade
practices" jurisprudence should permit state attorneys general,13 in their
respective jurisdictions, to establish product safety standards for goods that
fall through the existing safety net,14 including defective handguns.
The Article first reviews the existing product safety framework,
noting the shortcomings of that two-tiered system. It then discusses
possible alternatives to improve the current system, pointing out the
difficulties with each. The Article next analyzes how unfair trade law can
be used to regulate product safety, and how this solution provides an
existing, simple, and readily available tool to patch the product safety net.
Finally, the Article will consider potential criticisms of this new legal
device and address public policy considerations as to whether the attorneys
general should use it to make products safer.
I. The Existing System
The current product safety system in the United States can most
simply be viewed as divided between government oversight and private
corrective action. The large majority of products are subject to the
oversight of one or more federal administrative agencies, whose standards
and regulatory precepts set a floor for product safety. 5 To a large extent,
state regulation is absent from these areas due to the preemptive effect of
federal regulations under these legislative schemes 6 and the basic, though
unpleasant, fact that state legislatures are often not well equipped to
address the detailed specific issues of product safety. t7 Thus, specific
13 The term "attorney general" is used generally here, although in some states the
implementation of unfair trade practices law (known as "Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices law,"
or "UDAP law") is delegated in whole or in part to a different state agency, such as a Commissioner of
Consumer Affairs. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 480 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-101 to 30-
14-143 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-1 (West 1995).
14 See infra Part I11.
15 The CPSC regulates the safety of "consumer products." 15 U.S.C. § 2051-2052 (1994)
(establishing the CPSC and broadly defining consumer products). Other federal agencies regulate
safety of specific products within their expertise. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30101-30111 (1994) (authorizing
the Department of Transportation to regulate motor vehicle safety); 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101, 44701 (1994)
(authorizing the Federal Aviation Authority to regulate safety of aircraft); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 (1994)
(authorizing the Food and Drug Administration to regulate safety of food, drugs, medical devices, and
cosmetics).
16 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1994) (stating that CPSC regulations establishing safety
standards preempt state standards).
17 This is reflected in the findings that supported the enactment of the Consumer Product
Safety Act: "control by state and local governments of unreasonable risks of injury associated with
consumer products is inadequate." 15 U.S.C. § 2051(a)(4) (1994). Indeed, state efforts, even when
undertaken, have tended to aim haphazardly "at specific hazards or narrow categories of products," and
rarely allocate the needed support to see these efforts through. WILLIAM KIMBLE, FEDERAL
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 43-47 (1975).
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product safety standards tend to be driven largely by the actions of federal
agencies.
Complementing this federal role is a tort system based largely in state
law, through which injured consumers may bring private suits against
makers or sellers of defective products. Because of the possibility of
substantial damage awards, manufacturers usually take into account tort
liability when designing products and take precautions against releasing
defective goods into the stream of commerce.
18
This Part provides a brief overview of the two tiers that compose the
safety net and the substantial benefits each brings to consumers. It then
focuses particularly on the flaws in the safety net, where the existing
system fails to provide consumers with the necessary reliable protection.
A. Federal Regulatory Powers in Consumer Safety
During the 1970s, the United States Congress began an initiative to
concentrate the product regulatory powers that were nascent and dispersed
throughout the federal government into a single, quasi-independent
agency. Using the increasingly refined approach of administrative
rulemaking' 9 as well as other more traditional enforcement vehicles, this
agency was given the task of overseeing the safety of over 10,000
consumer products commonly used by American consumers. 20 Although a
variety of specialized consumer products remained within the purview of
other federal agencies, 2' most products purchased by consumers were
subject to review by the new CPSC.
Consumer protection was not a new issue for the federal government.
A litany of federal statutes had established specific standards for certain
goods, and others had directed agencies to create safety standards for
specific product lines, such as refrigerators and flammable fabrics.
22
Moreover, federal agencies with broad consumer protection mandates,
most notably the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), had at times addressed
the sale of unsafe products with whatever procedural tools were at their
18 Cf 63 AM. JUR. 2D § 1 (1996) ("[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed
wherever it will most effectively reduce the hazards of life and limb inherent in defective products that
reach the market.").
19 See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); see also
National Petroleum Refineries Assoc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Chevron,
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 487 U.S. 837 (1984).
20 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2052 (1988). Section 2052(a)(1) defines "consumer product" as:
any article, or component thereof, produced or distributed i) for sale to a consumer for use
in or around a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or
otherwise, or ii) for the personal use, consumption or enjoyment of a consumer in or around
a permanent or temporary household or residence, a school, in recreation, or otherwise ....
15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1).
21 See supra notes 4, 15.
22 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1211-1214 (1994); id. §§ 1191-1204.
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disposal.23
Congress, however, decided to centralize these activities and to
promote product safety through prospective rulemaking, rather than
piecemeal legislation or post hoc adjudication. Many legislators hoped that
this new agency, the CPSC, would rigorously review consumer products,
take the time to gather all necessary information, and use its developing
expertise to set appropriate safety standards.24
Most observers agree that the experiment was a success. 25 Since the
enactment of the Consumer Product Safety Act and related statutes, the
rates of injury from a wide variety of consumer products have greatly
declined.26 The agency itself commonly trumpets that its regulations have
drastically reduced injuries by forcing manufacturers to make safer cribs,
bicycles, cigarette lighters, fireworks, and drug packaging.27 Moreover, the
mere possibility that the CPSC might regulate a product provides some
deterrence against poor design.28 The CPSC's regulatory power allows it to
obtain "voluntary" industry compliance with basic safety principles in
many areas of manufacturing. 29 The CPSC is able to convince companies
to modify and even recall hundreds of products each year to improve
safety.3° Further, the CPSC's "suggestions" to industry groups have in the
past resulted in prompt alteration of industry standards to ameliorate
informal CPSC concerns. 3' Given the cost of recalls and post hoc product
redesign, responsible companies are likely to consider potential CPSC
action when preparing their products for market.
B. The Tort Deterrence Backdrop
The common law tort system, which allows private parties to bring
23 See, e.g., In re Chemway Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1250 (1971) (stopping the sale of a toothbrush
treated with dangerous chemicals by the FTC using its adjudicatory powers).
24 See SEN. REPORT NO. 92-835 reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4573; HOUSE CONF.
REPORT NO. 92-1593, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4597.
25 While its popularity with Congress, the President, and commentators has fluctuated, most
would agree (though perhaps some only grudgingly) that the CPSC overall has improved consumer
product safety. See, e.g., Robert S. Adler, From Model Agency to Basket Case-Can the CPSC Be
Redeemed?, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 129 (1989).
26 See, e.g., Playing it Safe, supra note 3, at 20 (discussion of increased toy safety by CPSC
Commissioner Anne Brown); U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, SAVING LIVES THROUGH
SMART GOVERNMENT (1996) [hereinafter SMART GOVERNMENT]; U.S. CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY
COMM'N, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT (1995).
27 See generally SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26.
28 See also Playing It Safe, supra note 3, at 20 ("[Ilt's wonderful how a potential regulation
stimulates an industry's creativity.").
29 See 15 U.S.C. § 2058(b) (1988) (promoting voluntary standards); 16 C.F.R. § 1031
(1999) (noting CPSC participation in and assistance in creating voluntary standards).
30 In 1994, the CPSC requested voluntary recalls for over 300 products. In every case, the
companies complied. See SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 11-12.
31 See id. at 6-11.
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civil actions against the manufacturers or sellers of defective or unsafe
goods, serves as a backdrop to federal regulation and an additional layer of
protection against unsafe products. When constructing the federal
regulatory regime, Congress took great pains not to disturb the tort
remedies already available to consumers.3 2 Indeed, with few exceptions,
federal law generally has left the state tort system in place. Tort law
continues to serve the vital function of disciplining the market and
ensuring that manufacturers pay close attention to safety issues, even when
the relevant federal regulatory agencies are unfocused or unconcerned.33
Product safety tort law, which developed initially as a common law
state doctrine but has been altered to some degree by statute in many
jurisdictions,34 has developed along several different lines. Victims harmed
by defective or unsafe products may recover their damages under a theory
of negligent design (the manufacturer failed to take reasonable care in
designing his product) or certain versions of strict liability (regardless of
the care taken, the manufacturer sold a product that was unfit for the
purpose for which it is generally used, and an adequate alternative design
was practicable).35 In instances where the manufacturer knows of the
danger but proffers the goods for sale anyway, many jurisdictions provide
for punitive damages.36 When combined with the availability of class
actions, 37 even minor product safety hazards can create substantial
monetary risks for commercial sellers. As a general matter, the incentive to
design a safe product could not be clearer. In combination with federal
regulatory authority, tort law deterrence creates a life-saving safety net in
the consumer product marketplace.
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). As a practical matter, however, compliance with a CPSC
safety regulation may insulate a defendant from a tort claim that would seek to impose conduct
contrary to the CPSC regulation. See, e.g., Moe v. MTD Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995).
However, this is relevant only for those few types of products subject to an existing CPSC regulation.
Tort law applies to all other products. Moreover, tort suits also provide an additional level of protection
when CPSC regulations are violated. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2073 (1988) (stipulating a private right of
action for a knowing violation of a CPSC standard).
33 See, e.g., Johnston v. Deere & Co., 967 F. Supp. 578, 580 (D. Me. 1997) ("Congress was
concerned . . . that the creation of the CPSC and its new authority would not impede common law
litigation in the states over unsafe products."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2074(b) (1988) (ensuring that
nonaction by federal agency does not interfere with state tort suit); KIMBLE, supra note 17, at 282-83
(stating that Congress intended CPSC safety standards to supplement state tort law product safety
remedies, not to establish exclusive safety standards).
34 See 63 AM. JUR. 2d § 2 (1996).
35 See id. § 3.
36 See, e.g., Loudermill v. Dow Chem. Co., 863 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1988); 63 AM. JUR. 2d
§§ 1933, 1941 (1996).
37 Class actions may be appropriate for product safety claims where a common question
predominates among all plaintiffs. See 63 AM. JUR. 2d § 1718. However, plaintiffs may find it difficult
to certify a class in a product liability suit. See cases cited infra note 80.
260
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C. Holes in the Net
As useful as the current product safety system is, both federal
regulatory authority and the private tort adjudicatory framework are
imperfect tools to protect consumers from dangerous products. While the
flaws in each system could conceivably be counteracted and balanced by
the strengths of the other (i.e., if one system does not work particularly
well in a given instance, the other can still function to provide the needed
protection), the "holes" in each level of the safety net sometimes overlap.
Thus, for certain types of products, consumers are left with little actual
protection and no real deterrence against the sale of unsafe goods.
1. Holes in the Federal Regulatory Protections
The most glaring defects in the federal regulatory system are the
statutory exemptions from the CPSC's authority. Written directly into the
enabling laws, these exemptions specifically bar the CPSC from regulating
a variety of consumer products. 38 All firearms, tobacco products, motor
vehicle equipment, home pest devices, airplane-related appliances,
cosmetics, and food items, as well as other goods that display specific
types of hazards, are exempt from CPSC oversight. While many of these
product types are regulated by other federal agencies,39 such regulators
lack the more generalized experience of the CPSC and may not have the
practical ability to address all consumer safety issues (one of the original
reasons for the creation of the CPSC).40 Moreover, items such as firearms
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(l)(A)(l) (1994).
39 See supra note 15.
40 See Adler, supra note 25, at 64 (noting congressional awareness of the shortcomings of
existing agencies prior to creation of the CPSC). While some scholars imply that agency specialization
along industry lines should lead to higher quality oversight, practical difficulties may weigh against
such an outcome. Industry-specific agencies may be more prone to agency capture. See, e.g., 126
CONG. REC. S5688 (1980) (noting that the generalist FTC "is th[e] watchdog ... I only wish that other
federal agencies, which so often become creatures of the industries they are supposed to regulate, felt
as strongly about the people's rights"). They also may be less likely to focus on consumer protection
issues, neglecting such duties in order to focus on their main regulatory raison d'etre. Cf., e.g., S. REP.
No. 93-280, at 14 (1973) (noting the Federal Reserve's lack of enthusiasm for its ancillary consumer
responsibilities, except when banking industry itself wants intervention); 126 CONG. REC. S1228
(1980) (noting Department of Health, Education and Welfare's need of FTC assistance); 125 CONG.
REc. H11,194 (1979) (noting poor enforcement of fair trade requirements by Department of
Agriculture, and indicating that the FTC, as a general antitrust enforcer, is better equipped with respect
to such issues). In addition, these agencies' concentration on a single industry may leave them less
cognizant of consumer use patterns that apply generally to consumer protection but may not have
arisen previously in the context of the one specific class of products within the agency's purview. See
generally MODENA HOOVER WILSON ET AL., SAVING CHILDREN: A GUIDE TO INJURY PREVENTION
(1991). For instance, CPSC experience with childproofing in various contexts would give it broader
insight into the need for and viability of various childproofing devices in a given product than an
agency dealing with such devices for the first time. See, e.g., SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at
9-10 (noting that the CPSC uses generally applicable child safety research and development to improve
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are not regulated for product safety by any other federal agency. 4  The
exemption completely removes firearms from this tier of the consumer
safety net.
Another practical flaw is the very few prospective standards for
consumer products actually established by the CPSC. Over the course of
thirty years, the CPSC has promulgated only fifteen sets of mandatory
product design rules under the Consumer Product Safety Act, with most of
these being issued in the agency's early years.42 Thus, there are few
consumer products actually governed by regulatory design standards. Such
administrative lethargy not only means that most products are not subject
to specific regulatory standards but also risks eroding the deterring power
of the regulatory apparatus.43 Industry skepticism of the CPSC's will to act
may be countered by a concomitant fear that the CPSC is simply satisfied
with the status quo, and that the lack of regulations merely reflects general
industry compliance with CPSC safety goals. However, such a fear can
lessen over time, as the CPSC fails to obtain rigorous and universally
applicable industry concessions on safety and yet still abjures new
regulations.44 Given the infrequency of regulatory action in this arena,
manufacturers may begin to discount the possibility of future regulation
and take their design responsibilities less seriously.45
cribs and hair dryers); id. at 7-8 (same for children's clothing hazards). Moreover, a generalized
consumer protection agency, well experienced in dealing with and anticipating unscrupulous business
actions, may be in a better posture to analyze industry positions and arguments than an agency whose
general success relies upon long term cooperation with a small set of industrial players.
41 Imported firearms are subject to some restrictions upon entry into the United States, and
the Customs Department will seize nonconforming goods. However, the domestic market is
completely unregulated by federal agencies regarding safety issues. The main federal agency with
authority over firearms, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, is a subdivision of the
Treasury Department, and spends its time enforcing licensing and taxation issues, which often manifest
themselves in the criminal bootlegging or unlicensed possession of certain types of firearms.
42 See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1201-1306 (1999) (detailing CPSC product safety regulations and
bans). The agency has created additional rules under other consumer protection statutes that provide it
with additional authority. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 1507-1512 (1999) (regulations for hazardous
substances); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1610-1632 (1999) (regulations for flammable fabrics); 16 C.F.R. §§ 1700-
1702 (1999) (regulations for poison prevention). Even taking these regulations into account,
manufacturers have relatively few CPSC guidelines to look to in designing products for consumer
distribution.
43 Thus, while not itself constituting a specific "hole" in the safety net, the dearth of new
CPSC regulations may gradually make manufacturers believe that they have less to fear from the
CPSC. This causes a general weakening of the deterrent effect of the first tier of the net, which, when
lined up with areas of weakness in the second (tort) tier of the safety net, creates de facto gaps in
consumer protection by not offering significant combined deterrence to thwart unsafe product design.
44 See, e.g., SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 3 (noting the CPSC's current position
that "smart government need not be mandatory,... regulatory... [or] rigid"); id. at 7 (noting that the
CPSC settles for voluntary standards that exempt some children's garments from corrective design
changes); id. at 9 (deferring to industry on standards needed for certain cribs); id. at 26 (noting that the
CPSC only shifts from tentative voluntary standard to actual regulation when industry requests this
action in order to preempt tougher impending state standards).
45 This will also be true if the industry has been successful in its attempts to compromise
the regulator's independent judgment. This phenomenon of "agency capture" has been discussed in
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2. Defects in Tort Deterrence
Just as the true value of regulatory deterrence is questionable (or
nonexistent) for certain types of products, the efficacy of tort deterrence
turns in part on the kinds of goods at issue. While a variety of products
may raise their own unique difficulties, the shortcomings of tort deterrence
are particularly acute where products are the center of public policy
debate, require skill in handling to assure safe use, or are sophisticated
devices used in complex circumstances.
Products that are at the center of a public policy debate are the worst
subjects for effective tort deterrence. Courts are often reluctant to involve
themselves in policy debates that they view as more appropriate for the
legislature.46 Indeed, a judge may feel that the law is being misused by
plaintiffs to further a social agenda, rather than for its original purposes of
compensation, deterrence, or cost-spreading. When faced with such an
issue, there is at least a possibility that a court will simply reject the suit
out of hand.47 Such courts may determine that, given the pendant social
concerns actually propelling the case, tort law is a poor vehicle for
resolving the issue. 48 This has been repeatedly true in firearm safety cases,
other literature. See generally Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle To Pass Food
Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142 (1998); Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1998); George J. Stigler, The Theory
of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971). While not addressed in detail here,
agency capture demonstrates yet another potential pitfall of relying on a single administrative entity to
protect consumers.
46 See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc., 743 F.2d 1200, 1204 (7th Cir. 1984)
(declining to eliminate industry by judicial fiat); Leslie v. U.S., 986 F. Supp. 900, 912 (D.N.J. 1997)
(declining to place a judicial ban on legal products); Mavilla v. Stoeger Indus., 574 F. Supp. 106, 111
(D. Mass. 1983) (deferring to legislature's consistent rejection of proposals banning handguns);
Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 467 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that no strict liability
existed without a defect absent legislative action). Some courts have noted that administrative agencies
are a better forum for such policy debates. See e.g., Wasylow v. Glock Inc., 975 F. Supp 370, 381 (D.
Mass 1996).
47 See, e.g., Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204 ("Imposing liability for the sale of handguns, which
would in practice drive manufacturers out of business, would produce a handgun ban by judicial fiat in
the face of the decision by Illinois to allow its citizens to possess handguns."). Although far less
common, there can be instances where the appearance of important issues in product safety litigation
might sway certain judges in a more interventionist direction. See e.g., Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497
A.2d 1143, 1153 (Md. 1985) (applying strict liability to the sale of various types of handguns in
Maryland), overruled by MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 361(h) (West 1996); see also Merrill v. Navegar,
Inc., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 146, 161, 163-72 (allowing plaintiffs negligence claim to go forward on an
important firearm product case). While the actual holding in Merrill may make sense in light of
Navegar's apparent statutory violations and unlawful marketing techniques, supporting dicta used by
the majority to bolster its holding can be seen as ignoring plain tenets of California tort law. Id. at 193
(Haerle, J., dissenting) (condemning majority opinion as "an egregious exercise in judicial
legislation"). Whether the majority position in Merrill will survive further appeal remains to be seen.
48 See, e.g., Wasylow, 975 F. Supp. at 380-81. ("It is the province of legislative or
authorized administrative bodies, and not the judicial branch, to advance through democratic channels
policies that would directly or indirectly either 1) ban some classes of handguns or 2) transform
firearm enterprises into insurers against misuse of their products."); cf. Kyte v. Philip Morris Inc., 556
N.E.2d 1025, 1029 (Mass. 1990) (noting in dicta that "[mlanufacturers of ... firearms .. .are not
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where courts have been reluctant to condemn entire lines of products for
failing to have certain safety devices or otherwise failing to protect against
harm or misuse.49
While many courts explicitly decline to resolve such policy issues via
tort law, others are less direct. Whether purposefully or as a byproduct of
refining tort doctrine so that it more cleanly adheres to its goals without
unnecessarily impacting unrelated matters, many courts apply a strict
construction to tort law elements in politically sensitive cases. This
approach is manifest in many firearm safety suits, where courts have
applied restrictive concepts of duty, 0 foreseeability, 5' and causation.52
subject to liability simply because they know that their product may be sold to or used by persons who
by law may not buy or use it").
49 See Wasylow, 975 F. Supp. at 381 ("[C]ourts have not imposed liability for categories of
products that are generally available and widely used and consumed, solely on the ground that they are
considered socially undesirable by some segments of society. Instead, courts have concluded that the
issue is better suited to resolution by legislatures and administrative agencies that can more
appropriately consider whether distribution of such product categories should be prohibited."); see also
Mavilla, 574 F. Supp. at Ill (stating that Massachusetts social policy permits handgun use and
ownership); cf Martin, 743 F.2d at 1204 (stating that guns are not unreasonably dangerous, and
Illinois regulates but does not ban handgun possession).
50 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding no special
relationship to a criminal that makes the manufacturer responsible for ensuring that the criminal does
not get Black Talon Ammo); Leslie v. U.S., 986 F. Supp. 900 (D.N.J. 1997) (holding that duty to
prevent party from using a product to hurt others will only arise if there is a special relationship);
McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (declining to extend a
general duty to public); Raines v. Colt Indus., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 819, 824 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (stating
no duty to warn or protect if danger is open and obvious to reasonable user, regardless of subjective
state of mind of this particular user); First Commercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d
202, 203-04 (Ark. 1995) (finding no relevant duty and dismissing tort suit against gun manufacturer);
Rhodes, 325 S.E.2d at 467 (finding no breach of duty if product meets general consumer expectations
as conceived by the court); cf Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 647 P.2d 713 (Haw. 1982) (stating
that no new duty on dealer stems from federal firearm statute); Riordan v. International Armament
Corp., 477 N.E.2d 1293 (111. App. Ct. 1985) (finding no duty to control distribution); Linton v. Smith
& Wesson, 469 N.E.2d 339 (Il. App. Ct. 1984) (holding no duty on manufacturer to regulate retail
resale practices); Forni v. Ferguson, 648 N.Y.S.2d 73 (App. Div. 1996) (finding no duty to refrain
from lawful distribution). But see Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
However, the novel approach in Hamilton, which espoused an expansive collective liability theory, is
at odds with existing case law, and the Second Circuit may reject the approach after review of the trial
results.
51 See, e.g., Raines, 757 F. Supp. at 819 (stating that it is not foreseeable that someone
would point a gun, even though he thought it would not fire); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586
S.W.2d 19 (Ky. 1979) (holding that the manufacturer need only foresee uses in line with the warnings
in the manual, and owner's negligence was an intervening cause); cf Talkington v. Cricket BV, 152
F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that South Carolina, which bases strict liability on expected use rather
than foreseeable use, may hold defendant liable for negligent design, which encompasses design for
foreseeable use, while not being liable on strict liability); Quinnett v. Newman, 568 A.2d 786 (Conn.
1990) (stating that actions of an intoxicated person supersede bar's decision to serve alcohol in an
accident case, but underage drinkers would be deemed at law incapable of voluntary action needed to
break causal chain). But see Kelley v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985) (stating that a
manufacturer can be liable for criminal use of a cheap handgun whose design caters to criminals).
However, the Kelley rule was not adopted by other courts and was subsequently overruled by the
Maryland Legislature. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 361(h)(1) (West 1996) ("[aln entity may not be
held strictly liable for damages of any kind resulting from injuries to another person sustained as a
result of the criminal use of any firearm by a third person..
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These courts have also endorsed expansive interpretations of doctrines that
serve as de facto defenses for product manufacturers by broadly
interpreting what constitutes unreasonable use by a plaintiff " and what
level of functional interference makes an alternative design unacceptable
as a matter of law.54 In addition, courts facing policy-driven cases that
creatively use tort law may be more willing to consider innovative
defenses.5
Moreover, products subject to intense policy debates generate other
laws and standards that may interfere with tort deterrence. For example, in
an effort to improve firearm safety, some state legislatures enacted statutes
requiring parents to limit child access to firearms. 6 In those states, when a
child picks up a defective handgun and injures herself, the chances for a
successful tort recovery against the manufacturer are likely diminished.57
The manufacturer can argue a break in causation,58 the elimination of its
duty by the new statute,59 and other defenses. The manufacturer also may
implead the child's parent as a defendant. 60 By doing so, the manufacturer
may decrease its ultimate liability through indemnity or by a division of
52 See, e.g., Treadway v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 950 F. Supp. 1326, 1336 (E.D. Mich.
1996) ("[Olnly a defective person would fail to realize [these] obvious dangers."); Smith v. Sturm,
Ruger & Co., 695 P.2d 600 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding verdict against plaintiff based on his
unreasonable use of handgun by carrying gun with hammer down on a full chamber).
53 See Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 968 F. Supp. 16 (D. Mass. 1997); Wasylow v. Glock Inc.,
975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass 1996); Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342 (1982).
54 See Wasylow, 975 F. Supp. at 370 (holding that safeties interfere with firing and thus are
not alternative design); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465, 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984) (holding
that lack of childproofing is not a defect). This is not to say that all defective product cases involving
firearms are rejected in this way. Some cases, especially those that focus on firearm defects that have
long been considered below industry standard, such as guns that discharge when they are dropped, are
successful. See, e.g., International Armament Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. 1985). However,
cases that seek to improve the current industry standard or that seek to eliminate harm by requiring
childproofing or use-limitation devices are more often rejected on the grounds discussed above. The
presence of cases that simply seek to eliminate all handguns based on their lack of "social utility" no
doubt add to courts' suspicions that non-traditional firearm cases concern social policy more than
producing a reasonably safe product.
55 Cf Bender v. Browning, 517 S.W.2d 705 (Mo. App. 1974) (discussing "antique
exception," but not applying it because the gun was modified to hold modem ammunition).
56 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1456 (West 1998); FL. STAT. ANN. § 790.174 (West
1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-315.1 (West 1999).
57 There is no indication in these laws that the purpose of the provisions was to limit
manufacturer responsibility to make safe products. Rather, the statutes expressly further enhanced
child protection by giving adults an extra reason to lock up their guns. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
724.22(7) (West 1999) ("access to loaded firearms by children restricted-penalty"); VIRGINIA CODE
ANN. § 18.2-56.2 (West 1996) ("[l1t shall be unlawful [to] recklessly leave a loaded, unsecured firearm
in such a manner as to endanger the life or limb of any child under the age of 14."). However, an
unintended consequence of this and similar legislative actions relating to high profile safety issues is to
alter the litigative landscape and weaken the tort tier of the safety net for that product.
58 See, e.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d 19, 19 (Ky. 1979) (stating that
negligence by gun owner is an intervening cause).
59 Cf Rhodes, 325 S.E.2d at 465 (holding that there is no duty to childproof where no
statute demands it).
60 See, e.g., ARK. R. Civ. P. 19; MASS. R. Civ. P. 19; NEv. R. Civ. P. 19.
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comparative negligence. This predictable drop in potential liability costs
will decrease the deterrent effect and thus limit the effectiveness of the tort
portion of the safety net in such circumstances.
The tort system is also less effective in promoting safe product design
for products that require skill to operate safely. While this may at first
seem counter-intuitive--after all, such products are most in need of safety
devices-the burden of proof in tort cases makes it unavoidable. Each tort
suit focuses only on the victim at hand.61 A monetary judgment (and its
deterrent effect) flows only from proof that a particular plaintiff was
harmed by a particular product's defect at a particular time.62 When a
device requires training for proper use, a plaintiff may find it difficult to
prove that it was the device, not the user or some intervening cause, that
was legally responsible for the injury.63
Some jurisdictions have limited the intervening cause doctrine where
a special duty or direct consumer-seller relationship exists. 64 Nonetheless,
judges or juries may determine that when items are placed in improper
hands, it is not the product that was at fault. 65 To paraphrase the Supreme
Court of Kentucky in a case where a gun owner handled a gun in an
61 See Louis S. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1.08 (2000).
62 The plaintiff also must show that a better design would have prevented the accident in
those specific circumstances. See DeRosa v. Remington Arms Co., 509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(ruling that plaintiff could not show a heavier trigger would necessarily have stopped this particular
accident where plaintiff contended that a light trigger pull caused the injury).
63 See, e.g., McCarthy v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding
that the sale of a gun to a criminal furnishes a mere "condition" for harm and not the "cause");
Delahanty v. Hinckley, 564 A.2d 758 (D.C. 1989) (holding that a criminal breaks causation absent a
special relationship between the manufacturer and injured user); Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d at 19 (finding
negligence by owner); Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973)
(holding that criminal acts are not foreseeable).
64 See, e.g., Decker v. Gibson Prod., 679 F.2d 212 (11th Cir. 1982) (stating that the
foreseeability of a criminal act stemming from a dealer's gun sale is an issue for the jury); Pavlides v.
Niles Gun Show, 637 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio App. 1994) (stating that the criminal act of a youth shooting
someone after stealing a poorly secured gun at a gun show is not a superseding cause because a
reasonable jury could have determined it was foreseeable).
65 See, e.g., Wasylow v. Glock Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass. 1996) (finding that a
plaintiff who shot himself while trying to fit a Glock in its box was more than 50% negligent);
Treadway v. Smith & Wesson, 950 F. Supp. 1326 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (ruling that Michigan's "obvious
and open" danger rule precluded handgun manufacturer's liability when boy fiddled with a gun's
hammer); Dias v. Daisy-Heddon, 390 N.E.2d 222 (Ind. App. 1979) (ruling that a plaintiff who shot an
air gun negligently is the proximate cause of his own injuries); Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d at 19. This doctrine
may apply only to negligence tort claims. See, e.g., Colter v. Barber-Green, 525 N.E.2d 1305 (Mass.
1988) (finding that comparative negligence does not apply to negligent design); MacCuish v.
Volkswagenwerk, 494 N.E.2d 390 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (asserting that the victim's failure to wear a
seatbelt was not relevant to the breach claim, because comparative negligence does not apply to non-
negligence claims). However, product tort claims under strict liability are still subject, de facto, to
analogous limitations. See, e.g., Talkington v. Cricket, 152 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding
manufacturer liable under state law strict liability doctrine only if victim used product in proper
expected fashion); Correia v. Firestone, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (Mass. 1982) (discussing how plaintiff
misuse can thwart claim); Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 661 P.2d 17 (Mont. 1983) (varying
application of assumption of risk based on victim's behavior).
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unskilled fashion, "guns don't kill people, people kill people. 66 It may be
difficult to convince a fact finder otherwise.67
Critically, under most tort theories, the plaintiff must show that an
alternative design would have avoided her particular injury.68 When a
product requires skill to operate properly, it is often difficult to show that a
given design change would have altered the outcome. Bumbled handling
of a product may well have caused the injury even if the safety device
were in place.69 Thus, even if a safety device generally would prevent
numerous accidents, a tort victim may not be able to prove that the safety
device would have prevented the particular accident. This increased
uncertainty diminishes the deterrent effect of tort law on product design.7°
Shifting responsibility to consumers, as the tort law effectively does
in the area of complex devices, is an ineffective way to prevent many types
of accidental injuries. Consumer behavior is notoriously difficult to alter.71
Even in instances where consumers can retrain their use habits, this will
not prevent a momentary loss of concentration, or tripping and falling, or
other types of situations where even the best intentions of consumers are of
no avail (this is also true, for instance, with many child injuries). Thus,
66 See Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d at 21 ("By their very nature, firearms are dangerous, but do not
kill people. It is the action of people in their use of firearms that kill or injure people.").
67 Some jurisdictions still allow some version of assumption of the risk as a defense to tort
liability. See, e.g., Zahrte, 661 P.2d at 17 (Mont. 1983) (holding that assumption of risk applies in strict
liability even though contributory negligence does not apply as plaintiff cannot recover when she
unreasonably and knowingly subjects herself to the danger). Where a device requires skill to operate
safely, the victim is almost tautologically assuming the risk that his failure to meet that standard of care
will put him in danger. Such a doctrine makes a successful suit even more difficult. See, e.g., Wayslow,
975 F. Supp. at 370.
68 See Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co., 968 F. Supp. 16 (D. Mass. 1997); DeRosa v. Remington,
509 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); Killeen v. Harmon Grain Co., 413 N.E.2d 767 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986). But cf Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ohio 1998) (applying a
generalized risk/benefit test to a design with no specific reference to the need for proof of causal
connection to the injury).
69 See DeRosa, 509 F. Supp. at 762 (finding no proof that alternative design would have
prevented harm in design defect case, thus no recovery); Bolduc, 968 F. Supp. at 16 (ruling that
alternate design of magazine safety interferes with firing, and because general users would find that the
device takes away from functionality, there is no case for the jury); Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F.
Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that plaintiff failed to show alternative design); see also Allen v.
Chance Mfg. Co., 494 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1986); Fahey v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., 482
N.E.2d 519 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); DiFrancesco v. Excam, 642 A.2d 529 (Pa. Super. 1994).
70 Although some might say that the application of such legal principles to product tort
cases simply reflects public policy choices embedded in the common law and state tort statutes, it
nonetheless represents just as much of a "hole" in this level of the safety net as the statutory
exemptions to CPSC authority. Both can be said to reflect existing public policy, as both are the result
of the current state of the law. But both leave consumers to bear the brunt of a manufacturer's decision
to sell defective goods and thus represent "holes" in the protection afforded to consumers under the
current safety regime. This Article categorically rejects the idea that the current safety net, even to the
extent that it represents current public policy, should not be bolstered so as to provide additional
consumer protection. Indeed, the purpose of this Article is to point out areas where consumers are not
currently protected from shoddy design and to suggest a way to put such protections in place.
71 See WILSON ET AL., supra note 40, at 9-10.
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injury may best be avoided simply by fixing the product.72
Similarly, even when the product does not require a skilled operator,
the tort system may not function well if the product is complex.73 Many
product liability claims have foundered on plaintiffs inability to show a
causal connection between a product defect and the injury incurred or how
an alternative design would have avoided the injury.74 Even where a
product is obviously unsafe, a plaintiffs inability to demonstrate that the
product's defect caused the accident can save a manufacturer from
liability. These difficulties of proof are exacerbated in cases involving
complicated devices. Such products can pose vexing issues regarding
proof of malfunction.75 If it is hard to prove specifically what went wrong
with the product in a given instance because so many factors go into it
working correctly in the first place, 76 it is more difficult to prove an
alternative design would have prevented the injury. The absence of such
proof substantially reduces the likelihood of recovery. While certain
jurisdictions recognize these additional difficulties and attempt to
compensate for them, 77 the tort system does not optimally ensure the safety
of complex products.
The shortcomings of tort deterrence noted above are in addition to the
general defects characteristic of tort law. As a general matter, tort
deterrence provides only inexact guidance to manufacturers regarding safe
product design. While many producers may be large and sophisticated
enough to determine the most reasonable safety measures to employ,
others will not have this expertise, will make mistakes, or will simply
guess wrongly. In addition, even when tort law works properly, it often
sets a fairly low threshold for product safety. Current litigation doctrine
72 See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978).
73 In many instances, these will be the same products as those requiring skill to operate, but
this is not always the case. An internally complex device might be operated by a simple push of a
button.
74 See. e.g. Hamilton, 935 F. Supp. at 1307 (rejecting certain claims for failure to proffer
proof that an alternative design that would avoid the accident); see also supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
75 This is also true with products designed to be used in complicated circumstances, such as
devices designed to be used for personal security in tense and urgent situations. A product operated in
circumstances where potential intervening causes are prevalent may result in a more complicated
causal picture, thereby making a finding of liability even more remote. See Bolduc v. Colt's Mfg. Co.,
968 F. Supp. 16 (D. Mass 1997); Wasylow v. Glock, Inc., 975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass. 1996).
76 Some courts establish a high threshold for considering products to be complex. See, e.g.,
Raines v. Colt Indus., Inc., 757 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (holding that handguns, which have
complex firing and control mechanisms and dozens of interacting parts, are simple tools because they
are not "highly mechanical"). That determination may be a further example of a court applying a
doctrine to block suits in politically sensitive areas. In Raines, the finding that handguns were a
"simple" device allowed the court to reject the suit under Michigan law. See id. at 824-25.
77 Some courts, for instance, eliminate the "open and obvious" defense when it comes to
complex devices. While theoretically this could serve to re-balance the playing field in those suits,
courts have often applied the doctrine restrictively. See id.
Vol. 17:253, 2000
Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net
does not require the producer to use the safest design or even to choose the
78
most prudent one. In many instances, consumer expectations, rather than
objective safety data, govern liability. 79 Thus, producers' incentives to
innovate and adopt proven safety technologies from other market arenas
remain limited.
In addition, tort law often provides weak incentives to modify product
defects that pose relatively minor potential for injury. Although class
actions may provide formidable deterrence, this procedural device is
unavailable in some product liability suits due to the individualized nature
of the harms involved. 0 Moreover, suits by third parties to recover for the
victims' injuries are often untenable. In many states, neither a subrogation
claim by insurers81 nor a direct action by the providers of medical
services" can be brought at common law. Public entities that attempt
similar suits may also face hurdles, especially if no special enabling
statutes exist to establish standing.8 3 The recent trend among cities to file
suits against handgun manufacturers provides a useful example. As an
initial matter, these cities will need to show that they actually lost money if
they intend to recover damages. Even if such damages exist (and in many
78 See, e.g., Torre v. Harris-Seybold, 404 N.E.2d 96 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980) (agreeing that
the manufacturer is not required to design the safest possible product or guard against all remotely
possible dangers); Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38 (Alaska 1979) (concluding that the state of
the art is irrelevant to determining product defect).
79 See Moore v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1985); Mavilla v. Stoeger Indus.,
574 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1983) (concluding that there is no breach if handgun meets consumer
expectations, because consumers know handguns are dangerous); Rhodes v. R.G. Indus., Inc., 325
S.E.2d 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984).
80 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting class
because no scientific causation issues in common). But cf. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 100
F.R.D. 718 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Generally, courts are reluctant to certify large product liability class
actions because, for instance, "no single proximate cause applies equally to each potential class
member and each defendant." In re N.D. Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 853
(9th Cir. 1982); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 7 FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 1805, at 541-43 & n.lI (2d. ed. 1987).
81 See. e.g., Frost v. Porter Leasing, 436 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1980) (finding no implied right
of subrogation for insurer to recover medical costs); United States Fidelity and Guar. Co. v. N.J.B.
Prime Investors, 377 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (concluding that volunteer has no rights of
subrogation).
82 See, e.g., Garweth Corp. v. Boston Edison Co., 613 N.E.2d 92 (Mass. 1993) (ruling out
recovery where oil spill resulted in construction delay); Chelsea Moving & Trucking Co. v. Ross
Towboat Co., 182 N.E. 477 (Mass. 1932) (finding that employer cannot recover from employee's
tortfeasor); Minnesota v. Phillip Morris, 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996) (rejecting common law claims
for Blue Cross to recover medical costs). But see Stop & Shop v. Fisher, 444 N.E.2d 368 (Mass. 1983)
(permitting nuisance recovery for money lost as a result of physical harm); cf. Bay State-Spray &
Provincetown Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350 (Mass. 1989)
(acknowledging a distinction for a personal injury case).
83 See. e.g., United States v. Standard Oil, 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (rejecting any common law
right for the United States to recoup medical expenses for treating a soldier injured in a car crash);
Town of Freetown v. New Bedford Wholesale Tire, Inc., 423 N.E.2d 997, 997-98 (1981) ("[Tlhere
seems to be no authority for common law recovery by a town of its expenses in fighting a fire ....
Safeguards against fire are maintained 'for the benefit of the public and without pecuniary
compensation or emolument."').
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instances the cities may be fully reimbursed or may never have owned the
facilities that spent money on medical care in the first place; non-medical
expenses such as police expenditures may be difficult to attribute to the
defective product), the case law provides several examples of suits where
the government's attempts to recoup money has been thwarted.84 In the
multi-state suits against tobacco manufacturers, several states were
shielded from these difficulties by statutes that specifically authorized
states to recover Medicaid payments. The lack of such a special statutory
authorization in the city gun cases is already having an impact on those
SiS85suits.
Finally, the case-by-case nature of tort litigation provides an
imperfect mechanism to enforce product safety. Because the tort system
refines its guidance as each case is adjudicated, case law guides
manufacturers only after injured consumers litigate a case to completion.
Further, the tort system functions as a deterrent only if manufacturers
believe it will be used aggressively. The system must make an example of
manufacturers who misjudged what the law would require in terms of
design, even if the miscalculation was an innocent one. Thus, the system
depends on sacrifices by both consumers (who must be injured to employ
the tort system) and manufacturers (who are forced to guess at the correct
standard and are penalized when they guess wrong). Such an approach
contrasts starkly with the first tier of the safety net, which provides
prospective guidance on product design. The second tier may generally
function adequately, but when the deterrent function is further
compromised by the circumstances described above, it provides too little
protection at far too great a price.
Thus, the dual safety net fails to protect consumers from certain types
of unreliable or dangerous consumer products. These include products
exempted from CPSC regulation that are also (1) goods that are at the
center of a public policy debate, (2) goods that require skill in handling, or
(3) complex devices used in complex circumstances.86 Handguns are
perhaps the best example of a consumer product meeting these criteria.
84 See, e.g., Standard Oil, 332 U.S. at 301; Freetown, 423 N.E.2d at 997.
85 See. e.g., Penelas v. Arms Tech., Inc., 1999 WL 1204353 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1999) (dismissing
Miami's gun suit on multiple grounds including standing and remoteness of damages); Cincinnati v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., No. A9902369 (Hamilton Cnty. Ct. Ohio) (order dated Oct. 7, 1999) (dismissing
Cincinnati gun suit on grounds similar to those in Penelas); Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No.
X06-CV-99-0153198S, 1999 WL 1241909 (Conn. Super. Ct.) (order dated Dec. 10, 1999) (dismissing
Bridgeport suit).
86 These criteria are not exclusive. Other types of goods also may fall through the net and
pose risks to consumers. Indeed, even goods that do not completely fall through the safety net may
nevertheless be at increased risk of product safety problems due to a lessening of deterrence. This is
most likely to happen where the products fall through only one tier of the safety net but are also
particularly subject to the general shortcomings of the other tier-for instance, a product at the center
of a public policy debate in an industry where the CPSC's lack of regulatory action has begun to erode
the agency's deterrent effect.
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Goods like defective handguns currently subject consumers to high
degrees of risk, and neither federal regulations nor tort deterrence are
likely to ameliorate this problem.87 To optimally safeguard the public,
another method of protection is needed.
D. How Best To Solve the Problem: Some Alternatives
A variety of options previously used to cure other public policy
shortcomings present potential solutions to the flaws in the current product
safety system. The most obvious approach might be to alter the statutory
scheme. Congress could set specific consumer product safety standards for
problematic goods. Alternatively, Congress could remove the exemptions
from the current federal regime and allow federal regulators to set the
standards. Neither alternative is realistic. The current federal exemptions
are not an oversight. They represent the political calculus necessary to pass
federal consumer protection laws in the first place.8
Notwithstanding recent relevant tragedies involving exempted
products such as handguns, this balancing of interests has not changed.
While Congress occasionally tackles certain specific aspects of a high
profile safety issue, those piecemeal provisions are no substitute for a
comprehensive approach to consumer product safety. Moreover, a small
and determined legislative minority can keep the law at the status quo and
frustrate a large majority in favor of comprehensive legislation.89 Thus,
federal legislative action is unlikely to change the safety framework in the
near future. State legislation suffers from the same improbabilities of
87 Firearns provide a graphic example of how dangerous the current situation is. Over 1500
people are killed by firearm accidents every year in the United States. See infra note 293 and
accompanying text. The GAO has predicted that a large portion of these injuries could be prevented
with basic safety mechanisms, which certain manufacturers simply choose not to use. See infra note
295 and accompanying text. Neither federal regulation, which expressly does not apply, nor tort
deterrence provides any protection from the sale of defective firearms that cause these deaths.
88 Even if Congress favored plugging the holes in the safety net, direct congressional
standard setting would be impractical. Comprehensive product standards require a great deal of time to
develop. Congress is unlikely to devote a substantial portion of its deliberative sessions to specific
regulations on product safety. Indeed, the legislative history of at least one consumer protection statute
reflects these concerns, and the qualms in the Congress regarding lobbying pressures that could stem
from direct congressional involvement in the standard setting process. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REC.
S5688 (daily ed. May 21, 1980); 126 CONG. REC. H3861 (daily ed. May 20, 1980); 126 CONG. REC.
S1052, 1077-81, 1093-98, 1237 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1980); 125 CONG. REC. H10757, 10772, 11204
(daily ed. Nov. 14, 1979).
89 See KEITH KREIBEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS 93-97 (1998) (discussing legislative gridlock and
filibuster processes). See generally J. CHAMBERLAIN, LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES: NATIONAL AND
STATE 174-85 (1969) (discussing legislative obstruction). Lobbyists need to be successful only with a
relative handful of legislators in order to obtain their objective. If the lobbyists approach 100
legislators but find only five percent are subject to various means of persuasion, that may still be
enough to block a standard. This differs strikingly from the situation where standards are set by an
independent regulator. There, a five percent success rate portends failure for the lobbyists, as they must
convince the top regulator in order to divert the safety measure.
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success.
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Another approach involves relying on local action by municipalities
to cure the defects. Cities and towns might attempt this by either launching
tort suits against errant manufacturers or enacting product-standard
bylaws. Neither approach truly solves the consumer safety problem.
The tort approach would require a city, or a group of cities, to
commence litigation against the manufacturers of defective products. The
cities might try to bring such actions on behalf of their citizens, or claim
that they are suing to recover municipal funds expended to ameliorate the
injuries or damage causedby the defective goods. This strategy has
recently been adopted by a coalition of cities concerned with firearm
defects.9 ' However, as discussed in Part I.C.2, the tort system does not
work effectively in such circumstances. Consequently, these suits are
unlikely to provide the necessary consumer protection solution. Indeed,
municipalities are even less likely to succeed in tort suits than private
plaintiffs, as the cities will have difficulty meeting standing and related
requirements.92
90 State legislatures occasionally have passed laws containing product safety requirements
in response to a high profile problem. The best example of this phenomenon is the legislative response
to handgun injuries. Several legislatures have enacted at least a few handgun standards. See infra note
299. Indeed, California just recently adopted such a set of provisions. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§
12,125-12,133 (West 1999). However, such legislation usually provides for criminal sanctions rather
than flexible civil enforcement and fails to fully address the safety issues posed by defective handguns.
In addition, to the extent that these statutes fail to delegate the task of crafting specific standards to an
administrative agency, the legislatures provide no method for updating or altering the safety criteria as
industrial developments require. Thus, while making an admirable attempt to address a high profile
issue, these legislatures fail to enact a comprehensive or long term solution ensuring that the dangers
will resurface in the future. Moreover, the exemptions and loopholes in these laws (whether lax
standards, difficult enforcement criteria, or, in the case of Maryland, the delegation of standard-setting
authority to a board including industry representatives) demonstrate how legislative compromise,
which is necessary to pass such a bill, precludes direct statutes as an effective way to patch the safety
net. See MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 36J (West 1996). It is theoretically possible to enact state
legislation that will not suffer from these infirmities, but it is unlikely. See, e.g., Md. Sess. Law (2000),
ch. 2 § 1. The recent supplemental Maryland gun law was touted as the first in-the-nation requirement
for built-in gun locks. See Daniel LeDuc, With President on Hand, Gun Locks Become Law;
Glendening Signs Measure Requiring Childproof Devices, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2000, at B4. The
law, however, fails to require such locking devices in its actual text and, thus, allows the industry to
argue that most existing guns already comply with the new law.
91 See J. Gibeaut, Gunning for Change, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2000, at 48, 48-52.
92 Regardless of these difficulties, proponents of the municipal tort suit approach might
argue that manufacturers will proffer safety accommodations rather than face protracted and costly
litigation. While a recent settlement between the city gun-suit coalition and a major handgun
manufacturer appears to lend support to this position, the efficacy of the municipal tort suit approach
remains in question. See Susuan Milligan, Gun Maker To Add Safety Measures; Clinton Hails Smith &
Wesson, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 2000, at Al. Indeed, it is unclear whether the gun settlement
produced any changes that the company had not already been contemplating. A Smith & Wesson
spokesman has stated that "the things that we have agreed to do are things that we have been doing,
things that have been in our planning process to do, and it really hasn't done anything other than
accelerate some of the programs that we've been working on." Ken Jorgensson, Remarks on Talk of
the Nation (National Public Radio broadcast, Mar. 21, 2000) (transcript on file with author). Moreover,
this type of settlement process simply cannot provide comprehensive consumer protection. To the
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Perhaps more importantly, the "sue and settle" approach does not
cabin the behavior of future market entrants. It does not even encompass
all current market producers, covering instead only those that acquiesce.
The manufacturers most committed to keeping their present product
designs intact, without additional safety modifications, would not be
inclined to settle. They would more likely rely on tort case law and litigate
their cases to conclusion. 93 Even if these companies were to lose a few
cases to cities at the trial level, they might still refuse to compromise and
instead rely on the appellate courts to reverse those decisions.
In addition to launching a tort suit, a municipality might consider
enacting consumer product safety bylaws. This technique shows some
promise and has been used over the last few years on the West Coast to
address the issue of defective handguns.94  Nonetheless, several
shortcomings make this approach ineffective as a general solution to the
holes in the safety net. First, municipalities might be able to focus on high
profile issues like defective handguns, but it seems unlikely that city
councils will be willing or able to address more mundane product safety
issues. Second, most municipalities are unlikely to have the focus,
expertise, or funding necessary to set standards for most products that fall
through the safety net.95 Third, in many jurisdictions, state law does not
allow municipalities to make such decisions.96 Finally, municipal bylaws
will only reach the city limits. A city-by-city approach will necessarily
create a confusing array of regulated and unregulated communities,
leaving many consumers exposed to safety risks and undermining the
extent that a settlement results from a coalition of municipal suits, it seems unlikely that the coalition
could be reassembled repeatedly in the future when the industry refuses to alter its designs to meet
safety risks not identified at the time of the initial settlement. Thus, the approach fails to provide the
continued deterrence or oversight needed in consumer safety issues.
93 Cf. Costa Mesa, Calif., Gun Maker Unlikely To Join Gun Regulation Agreement,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Mar. 23, 2000, at A6 (rejecting the Costa Mesa coalition's proposal of
settlement by Bryco Arms); Glock Decides Not To Join Gun Industry Settlement, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22,
2000, at A4 (stating that, according to a Glock spokesman, its refusal to compromise is "a matter of
principle").
94 Over 70 towns and counties in California have adopted bylaws that bar the sale of
defective handguns within municipal/county limits of defective handguns. See CALIFORNIA WELLNESS
FOUND., LOCAL ORDINANCE SURVEY, COMMUNITIES ON THE MOVE 2-7 (1998).
95 Product safety regulation is a time-consuming, expertise-intensive, and expensive
exercise. The California municipal handgun effort has shown that at least some larger communities can
muster the expertise to draft well-reasoned and intricate product safety regulations. See id. While
smaller communities could hire consultants to assist them, or rely on the work of other larger local
governments, it is unclear to what extent state law or constitutional requirements demand that they
have their own bases for adopting the standards at issue.
96 • See, e.g., ALA. STAT. CODE 11-45-1.1 (1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 36H (West
1996); W. VA. CODE § 8-12-5(a) (1998). See also HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. Houston, 201 F.3d
544 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding preemption of city ordinance); Amherst v. Attorney Gen., 502 N.E.2d
128, 130 (Mass. 1986) (noting in dicta that local ordinances are preempted if they conflict with state
legislation occupying the field). But cf. California Rifle and Pistol Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood,
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 591, 601 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (stressing strong California presumption against such
preemption).
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protection in those communities where regulations are in place.97
In addition to federal statutory and community bylaw initiatives, two
other traditional consumer protection remedies deserve consideration. Both
voluntary standards and the use of informational warnings have been
utilized as useful remedies to consumer protection problems. Federal
agencies often tout voluntary standards as setting meaningful minimum
safety thresholds without the need for regulation.98 Similarly, warnings and
disclosures of additional information have been adopted by at least one
federal consumer protection agency as the central (though not exclusive)
tool for addressing consumer protection.99 Unfortunately, neither of these
tools can realistically plug the holes in the consumer product safety net.
Voluntary standards cannot work in the very areas that are of greatest
concern-those where federal regulators have no leverage to require
product safety improvements.'00 Voluntary standards in these industries
will necessarily be watered down, unenforced, and not even adopted by the
fringe producers whose goods cause the greatest consumer risk in the first
place.01 Similarly, warnings fail to solve the safety problem in key
97 Indeed, just such a mosaic lies at the center of Chicago's recent claims against the
handgun industry. See Complaint, Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. (No. 98-CH15596). Chicago has
alleged that its own bylaws are subverted by unscrupulous commercial activity in adjacent towns,
where safety standards and other restrictions are not in place. See id. at 36-42. There is even a
possibility that the gun industry could try to challenge certain of the California municipal gun safety
bylaws noted above, based on a claim that the new California Penal Code provisions on junk handguns
occupy the field. Cf. Doe v. City and County of San Francisco, 186 Cal. Rptr. 380, 383-85 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1983) (rejecting local prohibitions on gun possession because of state regulation of this issue and
discussing implied preemption).
98 See, e.g., SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26, at 6; see also Adler, supra note 25, at 97-
103 (discussing CPSC's employment of voluntary standards). Indeed, Congress has set voluntary
standards as a goal for such agencies. See 15 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (1988) (directing the CPSC to pursue
voluntary standards when possible).
99 See, e.g., 29 Fed. Reg. 64-6585 to -6586 (1964) (concerning the FTC's focus on
regulation of health and safety advertising, rather than health and safety generally).
100 To the extent a company has decided that it is in its corporate interest to produce an
unsafe product, it is hard to see why that company would agree to a meaningful voluntary standard
absent coercion. Many voluntary standards effectively are coerced by federal regulators or policy
makers based on a threat of mandatory standards. See SMART GOVERNMENT, supra note 26. However,
absent an ongoing and credible threat of regulation, companies may refuse to agree to such a standard.
Alternatively, they might initially acquiesce but then fail to implement the new voluntary safety
measures. For instance, after an upsurge in political interest in the possibility of regulating certain
types of domestic firearms, the handgun industry adopted additional industry standards on
childproofing handguns. See, e.g., President, Handgun Makers Find Common Ground: Childproofing
Triggers, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at A16 (noting White House ceremony announcing voluntary
standard). After the threat of regulation receded, critics noted that the industry had failed to implement
or to police those new standards. See, e.g., DC Center Reports Gun Makers Not Installing Child-Safety
Devices, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 15, 1998, at A3.
101 Once again, the handgun industry provides a useful example. Firearms manufacturers
have adopted industry standards, but few of the lower quality gun makers have agreed to adhere to
these restrictions. In addition, the restrictions are not necessarily enforced. Finally, the standards in
place are notoriously weak. For instance, it is well recognized in the handgun industry that a firearm
should not discharge when dropped or jostled. See Larson, supra note 8. Yet, the voluntary industry
standard only tests guns for drop safety in limited, unrealistic conditions and only checks for resistance
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circumstances. They can be effective only if they attract a consumer's
attention, provide a reasonable explanation of the risks and potential harms
involved, °2 and offer a way to use the product in an ordinary fashion
without risk of harm.'0 3 Such conditions are difficult to fulfill, especially
when the victims of product defects are children that cannot read warnings
or third parties that are not even operating the defective product.
10 4
Solutions that require manufacturers to re-design defective products are
not subject to these limitations. Fixing a defective product removes the risk
of harm. That solution is far more effective than attempting to warn
victims about harms they cannot readily avoid.
Thus, traditional solutions to consumer protection problems fail to
provide an effective remedy to the defects in the consumer product safety
superstructure. The remedy needs to be one that is currently available,
provides the proper level of deterrence, and provides specific guidance to
industry. It should set an objectively appropriate standard and provide for
the expression of alternative viewpoints during the standard-setting
process. As it happens, such a tool is currently available and can be
utilized promptly to patch the product safety net.
II. Basis for Using UDAP Regulations To Patch the Product Safety Net
A. Introduction
The tool that can cure the current defects in the product safety net are
state "Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices" statutes, known colloquially
as UDAP. UDAP statutes, adopted by state legislatures across the country,
are a relatively recent addition to the states' traditional police power
arsenal. Most UDAP statutes were adopted between the mid-1960's and
to "jaroff" by releasing test guns from a mere one foot off the ground onto a rubber mat. See
AMERICAN NAT'L STANDARD, VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS % 5-7 (1990).
102 Warnings are useless if they do not make clear the extent of the danger. In one case, a
manufacturer of a highly corrosive acid sold as a household cleaner argued that its generic warning,
which was the same used on typical and traditional household cleaning products, was sufficient. See
DeHaan v. Whink Prods. Co., No. 91C0014, 1994 WL 24322, Jan. 26, 1994, at *5 (N.D. Ill.) (mem.).
The consumer spilled a single drop of the fluid on herself and the hydrofluoric acid in the "cleaner"
ripped up over three square feet of skin on her body. See id. at *3.
103 A warning that merely says that a good is dangerous is inadequate. If the consumer's only
rational choice would be not to purchase the product if he or she knew of its dangers, then only those
who fail to read the warning will buy the product. Indeed, this is exactly why tort law in many states
has rejected the idea that a manufacturer can avoid the duty to design a safe product simply by issuing
a warning. See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188 (Mass. 1978).
104 If a safety concern is at all complex, it may also be difficult to place a useful warning on
the product itself unless the product is quite large. While a warning may be given in some detail on a
lawn mower, there is little room for explanation on a handgun. Thus, for small products, the warnings
are likely placed either in a manual, where subsequent users of the product will not see them, or carry
so little content as to be almost pointless.
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mid-1970's to parallel developments in consumer law at the federal
level.105 While some legislatures created their own operative text in these
statutes, 10 6 most chose similar language drawn from "model" statutes,
which made unlawful any "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in trade or
commerce" and allowed for the state attorney general to obtain injunctions
and penalties against violators.
10 7
State UDAP laws typically follow one of several model consumer
protection statutes, including alternatives offered by (1) the uniform Unfair
Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law developed by the FTC and
the Council on State Governments, (2) the Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act offered by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State. Laws and the American Bar Association, and (3) the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act developed by the National
Conference on Uniform Laws.10 8 The model legislation generally is
substantively similar to the unfairness provision in the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act). 109 UDAP statutes do not attempt to define the
contours of this broad directive.110 Instead, the meanings of unfairness and
deception are to be developed over time, so that UDAP law can adapt to
future business practices. 1 ' Similarly left unspecified by the statutes is the
105 See JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT'L CONSUMER LAW CTR.,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES § 1.1 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter UDAP]. Congress
amended Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1938 to include unfair and deceptive acts
and practices in commerce under the prohibition on unfair methods of competition in commerce. See
15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988); EARL E. KINTNER & WILLIAM P. KRATZKE, 6 FEDERAL ANTITRUST
LAW, § 43.14 to .15 (1986). All 50 states and the District of Columbia have enacted at least one statute
barring unfair, deceptive, or unconscionable commercial conduct. See UDAP, supra, § 1.1.
106 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (Anderson 1993) (forbidding a supplier from
committing an unconscionable act or practice in consumer transactions); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 to
.641 (1995) (barring unconscionable tactics in connection with sales of goods or services); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24 (Michie 1994) (barring knowing and -intentional deceptive practices or
omission of material fact in connection with sales of merchandise).
107 Nearly all UDAP statutes bar unfair or deceptive conduct in some form. See UDAP,
supra note 105, app. A (cataloguing all state UDAP statutes, including the specific conduct prohibited
under each state statute). Many states enumerate specific prohibited conduct, coupling this laundry list
of specific prohibitions with a catch-all prohibition on unfair or deceptive conduct. See, e.g., 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 505/1 (West 1999) (prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including 26
acts enumerated in the statute). Other state UDAP statutes bar unfair and deceptive conduct without
listing examples. See UDAP, supra note 105, app. A (noting 14 states that list no specific prohibited
acts). Many other statutes vary slightly the description of the prohibited conduct. See, e.g., ALASKA
STAT. § 45.50.471(a) (Michie 2000) (barring unfair or unconscionable and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices).
108 See UDAP, supra note 105, § 3.4.2 for a discussion of the uniform acts and their
prevalence.
109 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988) ("Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce are declared unlawful.").
110 However, as discussed supra note 107, several UDAP laws contain a non-exclusive list
of commercial conduct that is prohibited. The conduct delineated in UDAP statutes often originated
with one alternative of the model Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, which set
forth 12 prohibited acts, such as bait and switch, failing to disclose that goods were used or altered, and
misrepresenting a product's endorsement or geographic origin.
Ill Several state courts interpreting UDAP statutes have held that the laws were designed to
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role played by the state attorneys general in UDAP development. Although
the majority of UDAP statutes specify some sort of rulemaking role for the
attorney general," 2 the scope of this role was not immediately clear.13
Developments in conceptualizations of unfairness and the evolution
of role of the state attorneys general in enforcing UDAP statutes have now
reached a point where these statutes can provide coverage for consumer
products not protected by the current safety framework. Based on the
combined doctrines that (1) UDAP statutes can reach the sale of
unsafe/unmerchantable products, and (2) an attorney general may issue
substantive and detailed regulations addressing any commercial unfairness,
UDAP provisions provide state attorneys general with the ability to bar the
sale of unsafe and defective products. These two lines of UDAP
development are reviewed below to demonstrate that their combination
provides the best solution to the current product safety problem.
B. UDAP Statutes Bar the Sale of Unsafe and Defective Products
The first key development that turned UDAP into a solution for the
current product safety problem was the expansion of "unfairness" to reach
the sale of defective products. This evolution can best be seen by (1)
reviewing the UDAP statutes, (2) surveying attempts to grapple with
general definitions of unfairness, and finally, (3) looking at the strands of
unfairness case law, which, taken together, bring unsafe and defective
products within the UDAP purview.
1. Statutory Interpretation
While the actual text of a statute is the first place to start when
attempting to divine its meaning, 14 the language of the UDAP statutes
provides limited direction in this regard. Aside from the non-exclusive
reach future business conduct. See, e.g., Purity Supreme v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Mass.
1980) ("The purpose of an open-ended legislative use of the words 'unfair' and 'deceptive' was to
allow for the regulation of future, as-yet-undevised business practices."); see also Fletcher v. Don Foss
of Cleveland, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
112 See UDAP, supra note 105, app. A (cataloging state UDAP statutes).
113 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 1997) (authorizing the attorney
general to make rules and regulations "interpreting the provisions" of the UDAP statute); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 13-2-5 (1995) (authorizing rules to "administer and enforce" UDAP statute); see also infra
note 114.
114 Legislative history also might generally be a useful tool in such an analysis, but it proves
unhelpful in the present instance. UDAP statutes provide little useful direct legislative history. See,
e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 303 ("[T]he legislative history of [UDAP] does not illuminate the
issue before us; indeed, there is almost no published material which sheds light on the intent of the
Legislature in passing [the statute]."); Maine v. Ford Motor Co., 436 A.2d 866, 875 (Me. 1981); see
also generally UDAP, supra note 105, § 3.4.2 ("State legislative history for a UDAP statute is often
sparse.").
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examples set forth in some state versions, 115 UDAP generally does not
identify the conduct that is "unfair." However, to assume that the statutes
themselves are completely unhelpful in showing why UDAP unfairness
reaches the sale of defective goods would be a mistake. In fact, the
language of UDAP provides several hints on how unfairness should be
interpreted.
First, UDAP statutes are written in a broad fashion."16 This style of
describing unfairness was not created from whole cloth by the UDAP
model statute drafters but had far earlier origins. Congress eschewed
limiting definitions in crafting the original "unfairness" provisions in the
FTC Act, the federal precursor to UDAP.17 Given what Congress
perceived as the never-ending inventiveness of unscrupulous businessmen,
it decided that the FTC Act's consumer unfairness provisions should be
flexible, allowing the maximum latitude to its enforcers (the FTC and the
United States Attorney General) and to the courts.' 18
There were also other reasons why UDAP statutes used such broad
language. Trade law was seen as dependent in part on general community
values regarding what was appropriate behavior in commercial activity," 9
which the state legislatures realized changes over time.120 Consequently,
the use of broad language facilitated the evolution of the unfairness
standard, which could then keep pace with consumer expectations and the
115 See UDAP, supra note 105, app. A.
116 See, e.g., Kukui Nuts v. R. Baird & Co., 789 P.2d 501 (Haw. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that
the legislature used broad language to create a flexible tool); Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P., 660
N.E.2d 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (giving the UDAP statutes a flexible definition); Purity Supreme, 407
N.E.2d at 303 (stating that the statute is designed to reach yet undevised practices); Missouri ex rel.
Webster v. Areaco Inv. Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that the UDAP law
eschews specific definitions in order to give broad scope to the meaning and to prevent evasion
because of overly meticulous definitions); T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial, 641 P.2d 1368 (Mont. 1982)
(stating that the UDAP law is general in nature because it is difficult to list the areas covered);
Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 816-17, 827 (Pa. 1974) (stating that the
legislature used expansive provisions to halt unfairness, and the UDAP statute is not to be construed
strictly like a penal statute).
117 See, e.g., Monumental Properties, 329 A.2d at 816-17, 827.
118 The Conference Report from 1914, when the FTC Act was addressed to "unfair methods
of competition," memorializes this legislative intent:
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to
human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known practices were specifically defined and
prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin all over again. If Congress were to adopt
the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task.
H.R. CONF. REP. No. 63-1142, at 19 (1914).
119 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (Mass. 1974) (stating that one
duty of the enforcers of "unfairness" laws is "to discover and make explicit those unexpressed
standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the community may progressively develop") (quoting
FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc., 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds, 302 U.S. 112
(1937)).
120 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 303, 307 (holding that the standard is to evolve
over time); cf Doliner v. Brown, 489 N.E.2d 1036, 1040 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986) (extending unfairness
to conduct that "elude[s] conventional definitions and categories").
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 17:253, 2000
misleading advertisement in a newspaper, which could impact an array of
potential customers, is actionable under even these more restrictive UDAP
regimes. 128 Once again, presented with a choice on whether to craft a
limited protection or a broad prophylactic one, the state legislatures chose
the latter.
129
A broad interpretation of UDAP statutes is further supported by the
fact that, although there are few explicit statutory limits to the unfairness
doctrine, there are some. This indicates that legislatures were indeed
crafting broad statutes purposefully, as they provided for outer boundaries.
For instance, while the substantive reach of UDAP statutes is left open for
future developments and interpretation, unfair acts or practices are barred
only "in the conduct of trade or commerce."' 3° This ensures that UDAP
statutes are used only against commercial sellers, who are bound to the
professional standards applied to professional tradesmen.' UDAP statutes
cannot be used as tools to alter the behavior of consumers or to address
unfairness, however acute, in the private or noncommercial sphere. 2
UDAP statutes also do not apply to business conduct that is approved or
sanctioned by other administrative bodies. 33 Courts have also held that
general principles of unfairness under UDAP statutes yield to other
legislative goals when those goals are specifically implemented by other
administrative agencies. 34 Moreover, UDAP statutes instruct state courts
128 See People v. Empyre Inground Pools, Inc., 642 N.Y.S.2d 344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996);
Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest, 381 S.E.2d 906 (S.C. 1989).
129 The choice is especially telling, because prior to 1938 the FTC Act did not contain this
broad language. The absence of the term "acts or practices" in the FTC Act led at least one court to
opine that the statute addressed only seller methods that were repeatedly and generally applied to the
seller's customers. See E.B. Muller & Co. v. FTC, 142 F.2d 511, 519 (6th Cir. 1944) ("[The FTC Act
applicable to 1937 transactions] does not deal with specific acts claimed to be unfair, but with unlawful
methods and practices in commerce .... The Commission could not prove a course of conduct for the
period charged by picking out a few instances of isolated sales.") (citations omitted).
130 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(a) (West
1997).
131 See, e.g., Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic, 461 A.2d 938 (Conn. 1983) (holding that the
UDAP law applied to attorneys); Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l. Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1981)
(holding that the UDAP law applied to banks); Cullen v. Inv. Strategies, Inc., 911 P.2d 936 (Or. Ct.
App. 1996) (holding that the UDAP law applied to mortgage broker). See generally UDAP, supra note
105, §§ 2.1.4, 2.2.
132 See, e.g., Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674 (Mass. 1983) (holding that a private seller of real
estate is not subject to UDAP); Wolverton v. Stanwood, 563 P.2d 1203, 1204 (Or. 1977) (requiring
that a UDAP claim arise out of transactions related to the defendant's "course of business, vocation or
occupation"); see also UDAP, supra note 105, § 2.2.5.1.3 & nn.344-45 (cataloguing states where
private sellers of homes are not subject to UDAP).
133 See. e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West 1997) ("[UDAP law shall not
apply] to transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory
board or officer acting under statutory authority of the Commonwealth or of the United States."). See
generally UDAP, supra note 105, § 2.3.3 (cataloging exemptions for regulated industries).
134 See. e.g., Aurora Firefighter's Credit Union v. Harvey, 516 N.E.2d 1028, 1034-35 (I1.
App. Ct. 1987) (exempting a practice from the UDAP law only if expressly authorized by another
statute); Attorney Gen. v. Diamond Mortgage Co., 327 N.W.2d 805, 808-09 (Mich. 1982) (holding that
a licensing statute did not authorize the challenged activity). The mere fact that an area of commerce is
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developing understanding of the responsibilities of commercial sellers.1 2'
In addition, such broad language no doubt enabled states to adopt uniform
statutory language without the need to tailor it to the specific needs of each
state's subculture and ethos on consumer protection. The language was
broad enough to be adopted nationwide, without restricting any one state
to another's view of consumer rights. 2
A second statutory hint on how to interpret unfairness comes from the
fact that UDAP statutes explicitly bar both unfair and deceptive
practices. 2 3 The inclusion of both terms provides an important clue as to
the meaning of unfairness. If unfairness reached only instances where the
seller misled consumers, or where he failed to disclose certain important
information, the use of both terms would be redundant. 24 Thus, even
where consumers have perfect information and know exactly what sellers
are doing, the statutes apply to prohibit conduct that is commercially
unfair.
12
A third statutory hint for interpreting unfairness is that UDAP statutes
specifically denote both acts and practices as bases for a violation, further
emphasizing the breadth of the enactment. Not only are longstanding and
ubiquitous practices the subject of scrutiny under UDAP statutes, but
single instances of consumer mistreatment also can be actionable.
26
Some states incorporate a public interest component in their UDAP
unfairness analysis, so that a single act, if applied only to a single
consumer, would not be actionable.2 7  However, placing a single
121 Case law indicates the evolving nature of the unfairness standard. See State v. O'Neill
Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1979); Lee v. Nationwide Cassel, L.P, 660 N.E.2d 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Webster v. Areaco Inv.
Co., 756 S.W.2d 633, 635 (Mo. App. 1988); Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d at 816-17, 827.
122 As a result, the consumer protection law in certain states occasionally strays considerably
from the protections typically afforded. See, e.g., Burdakin v. Hub Motor Co., 357 S.E.2d 839, 841
(Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that the UDAP law did not apply to a repair shop's misrepresentation that
a car had been repaired when it had not, because the misrepresentation affected only one consumer and
not the consuming public generally).
123 See, e.g., State v. U.S. Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 312-13 (Haw. 1996) (discussing
distinction between unfair and deceptive); Cherick Distr., Inc. v. Polar Corp., 669 N.E.2d 218, 221
(Mass. App. Ct. 1996) ("Deception is only one prong of prohibited conduct under the UDAP law.").
124 See, e.g, O'Neill, 609 P.2d at 520 (holding that acts need not be deceptive to be unfair);
Normand Josef Enters. v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 646 A.2d 1289, 1289 (Conn. 1994) (holding that
one prong is enough to satisfy the UDAP law); U.S. Steel, 919 P.2d at 312-13; Hylan v. Aquarian, 372
A.2d 370 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1977).
125 See, e.g., Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 676 N.E.2d 206, 213-14 (111. App. Ct.
1996) (holding that a mortgage assignment fee, although disclosed, is unfair because it is not part of
the buyer's transaction); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Mass. 1974) (prohibiting as
unfair a mandatory resale fee payable to mobile home park owner where owner performed no services
for the fee, even though the resale fee requirement was disclosed to consumers in advance).
126 See, e.g., Stop Youth Addiction, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 731, 742
(1998) (stating that 1992 amendments to the California UDAP law make it a violation to engage in
even one unfair transaction).
127 See, e.g., Burdakin v. Hub Motor Co., 357 S.E.2d 839, 841 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (a
misrepresentation affecting only one consumer does not violate the UDAP law).
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to look to the meanings of unfairness used by the FTC and federal courts
interpreting the FTC Act. 135 Although this last statutory directive is of
limited value in the analysis of issues that have not been an area of FTC
focus, such as product safety, 136 it demonstrates that legislatures adopting
UDAP statutes had in mind some limiting parameters. 137  Had the
legislatures intended to cabin the growth of the unfairness doctrine further,
they knew how to do so. 138 The absence of further limitations can be seen
as a sign that UDAP statutes should be interpreted expansively.
139
subject to potential regulation, or concerns an area related to an administrative body, does not preclude
UDAP application. UDAP law is displaced only to the extent the administrative body specifically
permits certain conduct under its authority. See. e.g., DePasquale v. Ogden Suffolk Downs, Inc., 564
N.E.2d 584 (Mass. App. Ct. 1990).
135 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West 1997) ("Such rules and
regulations [promulgated by the attorney general] shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations,
and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts interpreting the provisions of
15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) [the FTC Act], as from time to time amended."). See generally UDAP, supra note
105, § 3.4.5.1, app. A (setting forth precedential value of FTC decisions for each state).
136 The FTC has generally eschewed pursuit of product safety, instead focusing its attention
and resources on unfairness in advertising and informational issues. See, e.g., 29 Fed. Reg. 8324
(1964) (noting the FTC's policy in this regard).
137 See, e.g., State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Slaney v.
Westwood Auto, Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 773 (Mass. 1974) (noting that Massachusetts courts are
directed by the legislature to FTC precedent and the attorney general's regulations to interpret the
UDAP statute).
The legislative history of state and federal UDAP laws provides little insight into the scope of
the statutes. Most states lack any meaningful legislative history. While the FTC Act has a voluminous
legislative history, the statute has been amended numerous times. The resulting history is a morass.
However, there are at least some hints that Congress understood the unfairness doctrine to apply in the
product safety arena. See, e.g., EARL W. KINTNER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS
AND RELATED STATUTES 4897, 4981, 5126, 5132, 5143, 5155 (1983) (discussing references to
defective products and shoddy goods during congressional debates on amendments to the FTC Act).
Indeed, when it passed the Consumer Product Safety Act authorizing product safety regulations by the
CPSC, Congress was aware that FTC adjudication under the FTC Act reached the sale of defective
products. See In re Chemway Corp., 78 F.T.C. 1250 (1971). Congress did not reject that interpretation
of unfairness, although it did abandon the FTC's chosen methodology of case-by-case adjudication in
that context. See H.R. REP. No. 92-1153, at 24 (1972) ("Rather than propose individual legislation
designed to deal with the product hazards ... the Commission decided that the Federal Government
should abandon its traditional case by case approach to product safety and consolidate in a single
agency authority to regulate the full spectrum of products which are sold to or used by consumers.").
There is also substantial support for the conclusion that Congress intended unfairness to be a growing,
evolving concept that would apply to new issues in commercial trade as the conscience of the
community required. See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on
other grounds, 302 U.S. 112 (1937). However, the mixture of quotations and commentary in the FTC
Act legislative history ultimately sheds little insight into the purpose of the FTC Act and provides even
less insight into the goals of the state enactments.
138 For instance, in a Massachusetts statute specifically devoted to stopping unfair practices
by motor vehicle dealers, the Massachusetts legislature authorized regulation by the attorney general,
but also specifically defines the unfair or deceptive acts at issue. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93B,
§ 3 (1997 West) (authorizing regulations by the attorney general), § 4 (defining the unfair and
deceptive acts that are prohibited); see also Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 393
N.E.2d 376, 376-78 (Mass. 1979).
139 Manufacturers opposing UDAP expansion will assert that the absence of express
legislative permission to regulate a certain area of commerce indicates that this area is off limits.
However, this argument ignores the broad language used in crafting UDAP laws. It also ignores well-
established principles of administrative law governing the scope of statutorily delegated authority to
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In summation, a review of the language employed in UDAP statutes
at least shows that the unfairness doctrine was meant to be a broad and
evolving one. From this starting point, the case law has provided more
specific guidance on the scope and boundaries of the doctrine.
2. The Development of Overarching Definitions for Unfairness
Because state UDAP laws intentionally failed to define the acts or
practices that are "unfair" or "deceptive,"'' 40 the task was left to courts and
enforcement authorities.' 4' These entities have struggled to create a
working definition of unfairness. The most generally cited of the proposed
tests are the Supreme Court's dicta in its 1972 opinion FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson,142 and the definition set forth in what has come to be known
as the FTC's 1980 Unfairness Statement. 143
In oft-quoted language from the Sperry & Hutchinson opinion, the
Supreme Court set forth three criteria for determining whether a practice is
unfair:
(1) whether the practice . . .is within at least the penumbra of
some common-law, statutory, or other established concept of
unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or
unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).' 44
Similarly, in a 1980 letter from the commissioners of the FTC to
Senators Ford and Danforth, the ranking members of the Consumer
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, the FTC sought to crystallize the essence of "unfairness"
regulate under a broad remedial statute. See infra notes 213-16 and accompanying text.
140 See supra notes 116-18.
141 The task of defining is less difficult for deceptive than for unfair. Deceptive practices
could be defined based on long-standing, detailed case law on the parameters of deception and fraud.
See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965); FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S.
67 (1934); Koch v. FTC, 206 F.2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953). Interpretations of unfaimess under UDAP
statutes had to be made with far less guidance.
142 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
143 Federal Trade Commission Statement of Policy on Consumer Unfairness Jurisdiction
(Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Unfairness Statement], reprinted in Appendix to In re Harvester, 104
F.T.C. 949, 1070 (1984); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (codifying the 1980 Unfairness Statement).
144 Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 244-45. Numerous state courts subsequently employed
the so-called "S&H" standard in unfaimess cases. See, e.g., State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570 (Alaska
1981); State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 535 (Alaska 1980); Han v. Yang, 931 P.2d
604 (Haw. Ct. App. 1997); Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 676 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996);
EkI v. Knecht, 585 N.E.2d 156 (11. App. Ct. 1991); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Servs., Inc., 575
N.E.2d 1378 (II1. App. Ct. 1991); PMP Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 321 N.E.2d 915 (Mass.
1975); See also UDAP, supra note 105, § 4.3.3.4 & n.356 (cataloguing state courts that employ the
S&H standard for unfairness).
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in what is now commonly referred to as the 1980 Unfairness Statement.
The FTC stated:
To justify a finding of unfairness the [consumer] injury must
satisfy three tests. It must be substantial; it must not be
outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition that the practice produces; and it must be an injury
that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided. 45
While certainly valiant efforts, the very language of the standards in
Sperry & Hutchinson and the 1980 Unfairness Statement disclose that their
guidance is mainly ephemeral, and the definitions' generality provides
little more than basic guideposts regarding the scope of unfairness. 46 As
aptly put by the D.C. Circuit, "While the Commission's three-part
unfairness standard sets forth an abstract definition of unfairness focusing
on 'unjustified consumer injury,' it does little towards delineating the
specific 'kinds' of practices or consumer injuries which it
encompasses."' 147 In the end, development of the meaning of unfairness
under UDAP statutes was left to the fact-specific application of the
doctrine 148 by the state courts.
149
145 1980 Unfairness Statement, supra note 143, at 36. In 1994, Congress codified the 1980
Unfairness Statement as the official definition to be used by the FTC in pursuing federal unfairness
cases. See The Federal Trade Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. 103-312, § 9 (codified at
15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994)). States have not been particularly receptive to this statement of principles.
See, e.g., Bryant v. Sears, 617 So.2d 1191, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Legg v. Castruccio, 642 A.2d
906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); State v. International Collection Serv., Inc., 594 A.2d 426 (Vt. 1991);
see also UDAP, supra note 105, § 4.3.3.
146 See, e.g., American Fin. Servs. Assn. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 971-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(discussing the FTC unfaimess test's limited utility).
147 Id. at 972; see also id. ("Thus despite the Policy Statement's purpose of providing greater
certainty in application of the unfairness doctrine, it falls short of providing any concrete guidance to
the court in resolving the issues raised by petitioners in this case.").
148 See id.; Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748, 754 (Mass. 1974) (explaining that a
"definition of what is unfair" is to develop through the "gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion"). In interpreting the fact-specific UDAP case law, it is important to remember that states
have developed UDAP law at varying paces. The importance of consumer protection in a state's
common law, the presence of a large litigious private bar or an aggressive public enforcer, and the
existence of alternative effective state law remedies all play a role in how far the state's UDAP law has
progressed or evolved. Because unfairness is an evolving concept, it may well be that states with less
developed case law will need to proceed through intermediate levels of consumer protection already
traveled by more "advanced" states before reaching the same conclusions. It may also be that local
custom and the generally accepted balance between consumer rights and business freedom, which are
bountiful sources for the presuppositions that form UDAP law, will cause certain states to take a
different developmental path. Given the similarity of the statutes, however, and the state court tradition
of giving deference to decisions of other states' courts in interpreting UDAP statute provisions, it is
anticipated that most states will follow the lead taken by the more advanced jurisdictions. See. e.g.,
Normand Josef Enters. v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 646 A.2d 1289, 1306 (Conn. 1994). In order to
better explain both the current status of the law, and to acknowledge the evolutionary steps that led
there, the following Section addresses certain foundation UDAP unfairness case law developments and
then focuses on the adjudged principles of unfairness that demonstrate the applicability of UDAP
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3. Strands of Unfairness Case Law
a. Early Case Law Development: Precursor to the Relevant
Principles of Unfairness
For many years, UDAP unfairness cases focused mainly on issues of
consumer information and disclosure. Following guidance from the FTC
and their own case law on fraud and misrepresentation, state courts held
that deceptive conduct, such as bait-and-switch advertising or false claims
regarding product quality, was unfair and civilly prosecuted such practices
under both the deception and unfairness UDAP prongs.
1 50
However, as use of these state UDAP statutes matured and
proliferated, state courts began to venture into less well-charted
territory,' 5' addressing a litany of factual scenarios that had not been
reviewed by federal authorities. In many such instances, the defendant
seller had made complete disclosure,152 but state courts were nonetheless
uncomfortable with the seller's behavior. Instances where sellers imposed
fees without performing any service, l5 3 where sellers took advantage of the
weak bargaining position of purchasers,' 54 or even where they mistreated a
statutes to defective products.
149 UDAP statutes' unfairness development did look to their federal counterpart, the FTC
Act, for guidance, but due to the much greater number of suits brought under the state UDAP laws,
which contain a private right of action that the FTC Act lacks, as well as the FTC's limited
enforcement priorities, applications of unfairness to innovative and novel situations were often first
performed by state courts (and to a lesser extent by federal courts applying state law in diversity or
pendant claims) in state UDAP cases. See infra Part ll.B.3.b.
150 See, e.g., Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975); Greenbriar Dodge, Inc. v. May, 273
S.E.2d. 186, 188-89 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980); Attaway v. Tom's Sales, Inc., 242 S.E.2d. 740, 741-42 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1978); Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380, 386 (Cty. Ct. Ohio 1974).
151 See, e.g., State v. U.S. Steel Corp., 919 P.2d 294, 312-13 (Haw. 1996).
152 See, e.g., American Fin. Servs. Ass'n v.. FTC, 767 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Weatherman v. Gary-Wheaton Bank, 676 N.E.2d 206 (II1. App. Ct. 1996); DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d at
753-54.
153 See Weatherman, 676 N.E.2d at 206; DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d at 753-54.
154 See. e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979) (holding that
unconscionability under the UDAP statute considers whether consumers are economically
disadvantaged); Kugler v. Romain, 279 A.2d 640 (N.J. 1971) (holding that unconscionability is most
important when dealing with poor, uneducated consumers); Miller v. American Family Publishers, 663
A.2d 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1995) (concluding that the purpose of the unconscionability
provision is to establish a broad business ethic, and that the law implies good faith, honesty and fair
dealing); Wisconsin v. Fonk's Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 820 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983)
(concluding that it is unfair to exploit the weak bargaining position of a tenant in a mobile home park).
A few UDAP statutes also address this issue directly. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-601 (1999) (a
determination of unconscionability takes into account the vulnerability of the consumer group, very
high prices, one-sided agreements, and whether conduct outrages or offends the public conscience);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-2 (Michie 1998) (defining an "unconscionable practice" as one that takes
advantage of a disparity in knowledge to a grossly unfair degree or results in a gross disparity between
value received and price paid).
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consumer's property in an effort to secure additional repair business155
were all found unfair by state courts under UDAP provisions, despite the
absence of deception.
Over time, unfairness was even more broadly applied to business
conduct in more advanced UDAP states. A variety of merchant practices,
so long as they involved'commercial trade, were barred because they no
longer matched the sensibilities of the community at large. Sexual and
racial harassment attached to a commercial transaction,
15 6
misappropriation of intangible business property, 157 tortious interference
with contract,'58 the charging of unconscionably high fees,'59 and the
taking of steps that disadvantaged one's customer in order to gain a
business advantage 160 were all adjudged unfair under current commercial
mores. Courts began to acknowledge a broader UDAP purview and note
that unfairness applied to a wide variety of commercial situations.1
61
b. Advanced Principles of Unfairness and Their Application to
Product Safety
Beyond these basic developments in unfairness law, state courts,
through fact-specific adjudication, eventually developed additional basic
principles of unfairness. While none attempt to provide an overarching
theory for unfairness doctrine like that reached for in Sperry & Hutchinson
and the 1980 Unfairness Statement, they were at least successful in
providing practical guidance on the application of UDAP statutes to
various classes of conduct. Moreover, when certain of these principles are
taken together, they create an unfairness lexicon that clearly includes
within its scope the sale of defective and unsafe goods.
Each such relevant case law principle is discussed below. Following a
description of the principles, we note how their combination brings
defective and unsafe products within the unfairness rubric.
155 See, e.g., State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1981).
156 See, e.g., Haddad v. Gonzalez, 576 N.E.2d 658, 667-67 (Mass. 1991) (holding that the
intentional infliction of emotional distress, including sexual harassment, by a landlord can violate
UDAP); Ellis v. Safety Ins. Co., 672 N.E.2d 979, 986 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
157 See, e.g., Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (D.
Mass. 1988).
158 See, e.g., Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 583 N.E.2d 806, 822-23 (Mass.
1991).
159 See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Corp. v. Sargeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 1998).
160 See, e.g., Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1981) (holding that the
bank wrongfully dishonored a check in order to maintain money in the customer's account for payment
of the customer's debt to the bank).
161 See, e.g., Larsen v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1995) (holding that the UDAP law
applies to a broad spectrum of activity); Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979)
(holding that the UDAP law extends beyond common law and conduct prohibited by statute).
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(i) Implied Warranty as a Basis for Unfairness
UDAP statutes generally have been applied to redress unfair sales that
leave consumers dissatisfied. For instance, UDAP statutes and case law
have long prohibited the sale of counterfeit goods, goods that are of
substantially lower value than they appear to be, and goods simply not fit
for their touted purpose. 162 Because most of these sales involved not only
shortcomings of the goods sold but also dealer misrepresentations used to
consummate the sales, UDAP analysis in these cases typically focused on
deception. 163 In many such instances, no overt misrepresentation was
present, but the courts declared the sales unfair nonetheless because of the
lack of relevant disclosures. 64 Indeed, even when the core problem with
the sale was a defective product rather than misinformation, courts often
tied the "unfairness" back to disclosure issues.
65
This reliance on deception to tender unlawful the sale of defective
goods is not possible where no issue of misinformation is present.
However, during the last decade, courts increasingly have addressed such
unfairness without relying on the disclosure doctrine. Drawing on earlier
UDAP cases that held sellers to a standard of equitable behavior regardless
of the knowledge of the purchaser, 166 courts have held that the sale of a
sub-merchantable good is by itself an unfair practice.
67
162 Many of the UDAP statutes that include a laundry list of prohibited conduct expressly
bar, for example, representing that goods or services offer certain characteristics, uses, or benefits that
they do not. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(4), (6) (Michie 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-
2 (Michie 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(A) (Anderson 1993). Such conduct is barred in
other states as a result of attorney general regulation or litigation. See, e.g., UDAP, supra note 105, §§
4.7.1-.10 (discussing common misrepresentations prohibited by most states' UDAP law, including
misrepresenting product characteristics, uniqueness, quality, safety, method of manufacture, place of
origin, or endorsement).
163 See, for example, Rosa v. Johnston, 651 P.2d 1228 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982), where a UDAP
violation was found when a solar water heater did not work. Although the court indicated that a heater
that failed to work violated the UDAP law, the decision is based on deceptive practices, because the
defendant's brochure promised high quality, which it failed to deliver. See id; see also Kociemba v.
G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (finding a UDAP statute violation based on an
unsafe IUD, but stating that a violation also could be framed as nondisclosure/failure to warn, because
the plaintiff never received warnings or instructions and relied on doctor's statements regarding the
safety of the IUD); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Services, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378 (111. App. Ct.
1991) (holding that although shoddy services formed the basis for the claim, defendants also
misrepresented qualifications and licensing of workers).
164 See, e.g., Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1293.
165 See, e.g., Kociemba, 680 F. Supp. at 1293; Rosa, 651 P.2d at 1228; Hartigan 575 N.E.2d
at 1378; Church of the Nativity of our Lord v. WatPro, Inc., 491 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1992); Eager v.
Siwek Lumber & Millwork, Inc., 392 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); New Mea Constr. Corp. v.
Harper, 497 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985).
166 See supra note 152.
167 See, e.g., Pomianowski v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, 507 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(holding that personal injury from a defective product can yield UDAP liability); Paces Ferry Dodge,
Inc. v. Thomas, 331 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (concluding that the sale of a defective car violates
the UDAP law); Bott v. Sterling Homes, Inc., 527 So. 2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that where
a mobile home was defective and in violation of federal mobile home manufacturing standards, the
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The underlying basis for these holdings stemmed from a developing
public policy that consumers should be more substantively protected from
unscrupulous sellers. This policy, reflected in other case law, mandates
that commercial sellers have a duty to ensure that their products work and
provide value to consumers. 6 The burden is appropriately placed on the
commercial seller to ensure that the items are fit for their intended
purpose. 6 9 While in no sense abandoning the UDAP requirement that
consumers be provided with necessary information, this policy simply
recognizes that consumers may not always be able to assimilate such
information and that there is no purpose served by allowing commercial
sellers to clutter the market with nonfunctional items that would only be
bought by unsuspecting customers. 70
The public policy that commercial sellers should sell only goods of
merchantable quality also is reflected by the Uniform Commercial Code.
Section 2-314 of the UCC prohibits merchants from selling goods that are
unfit "for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used.'' In many
states, this is an absolute prohibition, which cannot be disclaimed by the
merchant in normal market circumstances. 72 Under UDAP case law, the
implied warranty of merchantability has been implemented in a variety of
commercial settings, including some beyond the statutory scope of the
UCC's implied warranty. UDAP cases have found it unfair for
UDAP law was violated); State v. Therrien, 633 A.2d 272 (Vt. 1993) (noting in dicta the lower court's
finding of a UDAP law violation based on the sale of defective development that had not complied
with permit process). The West Virginia UDAP statute defines merchantability and refers to federal
and state quality and safety standards and "good working order." W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-102 (1999).
This merchantability definition also includes all UCC warranties. See id.
168 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1330 (Mass. 1997)
("[Slocial policy, advanced by breach of warranty theory, [holds] sellers liable for the quality and
safety of their products.").
169 See. e.g., Vlases v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 377 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1967) (holding that
the entire purpose behind the implied warranty section of the UCC is to hold sellers responsible when
inferior goods are passed along to unsuspecting buyers); Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d at 1330.
170 See Vlases, 377 F.2d at 846; Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d at 1330. The policy also
recognizes that third party users may also be harmed by the defective products and also categorically
have no opportunity to assimilate product information. See Bay State-Spray & Provincetown
Steamship, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 533 N.E.2d 1350, 1355 (1989) (noting that a third-party user
"generally had neither the bargaining power nor the opportunity to bargain with its manufacturer or
seller and so could not provide himself with the same kind of protection that a purchaser of goods
could").
171 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, 4 2-314(2)(c) (West 1997) ("Goods to be
merchantable must [be) ... fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used."); see also
U.C.C. § 2-315 ("Where seller ... has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable
goods, there is... an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.").
172 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 106, § 2-316A (West 1997) (noting that in sales of
consumer goods or services, any attempt by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services to
"exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to
exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties, shall be unenforceable");
W.VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1999) (noting that one cannot exclude, modify, or attempt to limit any
warranty, express or implied, including merchantability and fitness).
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professionals to sell shoddy fixtures,173  defective realty,174 negligent
services, 175 and intangible merchandise of questionable value.1
7 6
Thus, it is the policy, not the UCC provision, that underlies the basis
for finding unfairness in this area. The UCC is simply one manifestation of
this public policy, just as the barring of sales not reached by the UCC via
UDAP statute is another. UDAP cases also apply the unfairness doctrine to
situations where UCC technicalities, such as privity, are not met.' 77 Sales
of defective cars, mobile homes, machinery, and building materials have
all been held to be unfair under state UDAP statutes.1 78 Although some
173 See. e.g., Chestnut Hill Dev. Corp. v. Otis Elevator Co., 653 F. Supp. 927, 932 (D. Mass.
1987).
174 See Krawiec v. Blake Manor Dev. Co., 602 A.2d 1062 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991)
(concluding that the sale of a defective house violated the UDAP statute). One closely related area
where state UDAP law routinely has been applied is the sale or lease of residential property that does
not satisfy the implied warranty of habitability. See. e.g., In re Cohen, 185 B.R. 180 (Bankr. D.N.J.
1995); Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 628 A.2d 25 (Conn. App. Ct. 1993); Hoke v. Beck, 587 N.E.2d 4 (I11.
App. Ct. 1992); Golt v. Phillips, 517 A.2d 328 (Md. 1986); State v. Weller, 327 N.W.2d 172 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1982). But see Bisson v. Ward, 628 A.2d 1256 (Vt. 1993) (holding that a habitability claim is
"distinct" from the UDAP law).
175 See, e.g., Reisman v. KPMG Peat Marwick, 965 F. Supp. 165, 175-76 (D. Mass. 1997)
(concerning accounting services); People ex rel. Hartigan v. Knecht Services, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 1378
(111. Ct. App. 1991) (regarding shoddy construction services); MacGillivary v. W. Dana Bartlett Ins.
Agency of Lexington, Inc., 436 N.E.2d 964, 969-70 (Mass. App. Ct. 1982) (addressing insurance
brokerage services); Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 647 A.2d 454 (N.J. 1994) (concerning failure by the
contractor to get permits, which allowed sloppy work that could not be checked by government
inspectors); R. Wilson Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. Wademan,' 588 A.2d 444 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1991) (regarding shoddy plumbing work); Brown v. Lyons, 332 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio 1974)
(concerning incompetence); Jaquith v. Ferris, 669 P.2d 334 (Or. 1983) (implying that poor service in
creating an earnest agreement violated the UDAP law).
176 See, e.g., United Cos. Lending Co. v. Sergeant, 20 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Mass. 1998)
(holding that it is unfair to sell high point loans); cf. American Fin. Servs. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 989
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (upholding an FTC rule barring loan terms that create a nonpurchase money security
interest); Arthur Murray Studio, Inc. v. FTC, 458 F.2d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 1972) (enforcing under a
federal unfair practices statute an FTC order limiting the length and size of dance instruction
contracts).
177 Most state courts have not restricted UDAP recovery for breach of warranty and
otherwise to those in privity with the seller. See, e.g., Utah v. B&H Auto, 701 F. Supp. 201 (D. Utah
1988); Larsen v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1995); Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d 464 (111. App.
Ct. 1986); Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 667 A.2d 624 (Md. 1995); Levy v. Edmund Buick-
Pontiac, Ltd., 637 A.2d 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Perth Amboy Iron Works, Inc. v.
American Home Assurance Co., 543 A.2d 1020 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988); State v. GAF Corp.,
760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). But see Simpson v. Smith, 517 N.E.2d 276 (Ohio 1987) (holding that some
privity of contract, even minimal, is required under the UDAP law); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
391 (1997) (holding manufacturers strictly liable for damages assessed against retailers that carried
their products, where manufacturers' "act or omission, whether negligent or not, is the basis for [the
UDAP suit]").
178 See. e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988);
Pomianowski v. Merle Norman Cosmetics, 507 F. Supp. 435 (S.D. Ohio 1980); Paces Ferry Dodge,
Inc. v. Thomas, 331 S.E.2d 4 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Rosa v. Johnston, 651 P.2d 1228 (Haw. Ct. App.
1982); see also UDAP, supra note 105, § 5.2.7.1 & n.534 ("A majority of courts find it is a state
UDAP violation to fail to comply with offered or implied warranties."). Texas case law also
specifically addressed unmerchantable goods as a UDAP law violation, when it held the sale of a
defective shotgun to be a UDAP violation. See International Armament Corp. v. King, 686 S.W.2d
595, 599 (Tex. 1985). However, the Texas UDAP statute at that time was unusual in that it explicitly
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states have not yet reached the issue, and others have only adopted it with
qualifications, 7 9 leading UDAP case law supports the principle that
professional sellers must sell goods that work properly.
(ii) Failure To Protect Customers From Unnecessary Dangers
as Basis for Unfairness
Another unfairness principle developed by state courts is that sellers
may not place their customers in harm's way unnecessarily. 80  This
principle developed in conjunction with state tort law, holding that
professional sellers have a duty to protect consumers from dangers posed
by their products. 8' While this responsibility is absolute in some
circumstances (with strict liability applied), 182 and relative in others (such
as instances where manufacturers are held only to a negligent design,
manufacture, or distribution standard),'83 it reflects a general policy
consensus that the seller is in a better position than the purchaser to
address potential dangers.
84
This duty is not satisfied merely by warning consumers of the danger.
The seller must take steps to eliminate the potential harm to the consumer
by fixing the product. 85 For example, in Uloth v. City Tank Corp., the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the effectiveness of
warnings must be balanced against the manufacturer's ability to
provided that any breach of implied warranty violated the statute. See id.
179 See, e.g., In re Clark, 96 B.R. 569, 582 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (concluding that not every
implied warranty breach is a UDAP violation); Emick v. Koch, 739 P.2d 947 (Mont. 1987) (finding no
UDAP law violation where the defect in a truck did not render it inoperable); Cox v. Sears Roebuck &
Co., 647 A.2d 454 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a defect is unfair, but not unconscionable, without
aggravating circumstances); see also UDAP, supra note 105, at § 5.2.7.2 & nn.536-37 ("A significant
minority of cases, however, hold that a breach of warranty is not automatically an unfair or deceptive
practice.").
180 See, e.g., Pomianowski, 507 F. Supp. at 435 (holding that personal injury from a
defective product can yield UDAP law liability); Whelihan v. Markowski, 638 N.E.2d 927 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1994) (concluding that a landlord's lease of premises with unsafe plate glass constituted an
unfair act in violation of the UDAP statute); cf Cox, 647 A.2d at 454 (N.J. 1994) (holding that a defect
is unfair, but not unconscionable without aggravating circumstances).
181 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1330 (Mass. 1997);
Zaza v. Marques & Nell, Inc., 675 A.2d 620 (N.J. 1996) (noting manufacturer's duty to make safe
products and to include safety mechanisms and determining that manufacturer cannot rely on someone
downstream to ensure safety of goods).
182 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
183 See, e.g., Thibault v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 395 A.2d 843 (N.H. 1978); Miles v. Ford
Motor Co., 922 S.W.2d 572, 585 (Tex. App. 1996).
184 See, e.g., Uloth v. City Tank Corp., 384 N.E.2d 1188, 1192 (Mass. 1978) ("We think that
in such a case the burden to prevent needless injury is best placed on the designer or manufacturer
rather than on the individual user of the product.").
185 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, cmt. J (1965) ("When a safer design can
reasonably be implemented and risks can reasonably be designed out of a product, adoption of the safe
design is required over a warning that leaves a significant residuum of such risks.").
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"anticipate and protect against possible injuries. ' 16 The court in Uoth
stated that warnings did not protect a garbage truck manufacturer from
liability where it could have made the product safer, holding that:
If a slight change in design would prevent serious, perhaps
fatal, injury, the designer may not avoid liability by simply
warning of the possible injury. We think that in such a case the
burden to prevent needless injury is best placed on the designer or
manufacturer rather than on the individual user of the product.1
7
State courts have incorporated this common law duty into UDAP law.
For example, in Whelihan v. Markowski, a landlord that replaced a screen
door in his building with plate glass, causing a tenant to severely injure her
arm, violated his duty to that tenant and committed an unfair practice.'88
As found by the state court in that case, "the property manager consciously
chose to disregard the immediate and direct risk to the plaintiffs physical
safety. Such conduct not only constitutes a willful or knowing violation of
[UDAP], it is conduct which is sufficiently egregious to justify treble
damages.' 89 Although the seller in Whelihan was also a landlord, and thus
may have had additional responsibilities to the consumer, the reasoning in
Whelihan applies to merchants and purchasers of other goods. 90 The
duties of manufacturers to sell safe products, derived from state tort law,
also square well with parallel FTC unfairness actions regarding the sale of
products that pose unreasonable dangers to consumers.' 9'
186 384 N.E.2d at 1192.
187 Id.; see also Sturm Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 44 (Alaska 1979) ("[Wlhere the
most stringent warning does not protect the public, the defect itself must be eliminated ... .
188 638 N.E.2d at 928-29.
189 Id. at 929.
190 See American Shooting Sports Council v. Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 904 (Mass.
1999) (noting that "the sale of products posing unforeseeable dangers constitutes conduct recognized
as falling within the [UDAP law] prohibitions ... and that breach of warranty constitutes an unfair or
deceptive practice") (citations omitted), see also Nielsen v. Wisniewski, 628 A.2d 25 (Conn. App. Ct.
1993) (noting landlord's indifference to tenant and tenant's young children). This is particularly true
where risks to children are involved. Both federal and state analyses of unfairness have often focused
on the need to protect the unthinking, the unsuspecting, and the credulous, as well as the sophisticated.
See, e.g., Murphy v. McNamara, 416 A.2d 170 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979). Thus, potential harms to
children can be an important factor in determining the unfairness of certain conduct. See, e.g., FTC v.
R.F. Keppel Bros., 91 U.S. 304 (1934); In re Audio Communications, Inc., 114 F.T.C. 414 (1991)
(holding that disclosure is not sufficient if conduct is targeted toward minors); In re Teleline, 114
F.T.C. 399 (1991) (same).
191 See, e.g., In re Harvester, 104 F.T.C. 949, 1073 app. (1984) (noting FTC position that
"unwarranted health and safety risks may also support a finding of unfairness"); In re Chemway Corp.,
78 F.T.C. 1250 (1971) (barring the sale of toxic toothbrushes). The UDAP statutory requirement that
sellers satisfy this tort-based duty is consistent with other UDAP cases noting that in a variety of
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(iii) Violations of Existing Laws as a Basis for Unfairness
The third relevant principle of unfairness developed by state courts
has been that violations of existing laws also constitute violations of
UDAP statutes. As reflected in the generalized unfairness description of
Sperry & Hutchinson, violation of existing standards is one test for
determining whether a practice is unfair.192 As is the case with the doctrine
of per se negligence, courts assume that statutes, regulations, and bylaws
provide a standard of conduct with which all reasonable merchants must
conform.'9 3 The pre-existing laws already contain a minimum baseline for
fair conduct, and failure to abide by these standards is automatically
deemed a violation of established concepts of fairness. 194 The principle can
also be looked at in two other ways: first, sellers have an implied duty to
obey the law, and their failure to do so is a breach of that duty. As
discussed previously, breaches of duties and obligations have long been
held to be unfair under UDAP case law. Second, all sellers that obey the
law compete on a level playing field. Those sellers that do not take
precautions required by law or fail to make the investment needed to
comply with statutory requirements not only sell goods that are legally
substandard, but also avoid the expenses incurred by those merchants who
fulfill their obligations. This gives lawbreakers an unfair competitive
advantage.
Regardless of how the doctrine is analyzed, it is universally accepted
in state UDAP law that the violation of at least certain types of statutes
creates a prima facie case of unfairness. 195 While some jurisdictions
192 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1972).
193 See, e.g., Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n. v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566
(S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that an unfair act in leasing property does not substantially comply with the
pertinent housing code or health code); Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp., 674 A.2d 582
(N.J. 1996) (holding that the Consumer Loan Act provides a standard for UDAP laws). In addition to
statutory principles of unfairness, some UDAP laws also expressly incorporate long-standing judicial
principles of unfairness, such as unconscionability. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.03 (1993)
("No supplier shall commit an unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer
transaction," taking into account the consumer's ability to protect himself and the inability of the
consumer to get substantial benefit); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1999) (barring unconscionable tactics
in connection with sales of goods or services); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-5 (1995) (prohibiting
unconscionable acts or practices).
194 See, e.g., Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc., 550 A.2d 1061 (Conn. 1988)
(holding that statutes constitute and reflect identifiable public policy, the violation of which runs afoul
of the UDAP law); Krawiec v. Blake Manor, 602 A.2d 1062 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (citing a violation
of identifiable public policy).
195 See, e.g., State v. Grogan, 628 P.2d 570 (Alaska 1981); Lemelledo, 674 A.2d at 582. This
rule of unfairness also is incorporated in certain UDAP statutes. See FLA. STAT. § 501.201-203 (1994)
(Definitions: "(3) Violation of this part includes violation of. . . c) any law, statute, rule or regulation
which proscribes an unfair method of competition or unfair, deceptive or unconscionable acts .... ");
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 3.16(3) (1999) (providing that any violation of a Massachusetts statute
designed to protect the public health, safety or welfare is an unfair or deceptive act); see also Sears
Roebuck & Co. v. Gold & Sudalter, 128 F.3d 10, 19 (Ist Cir. 1997) (discussing a violation of the
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currently apply the principle in a stricter fashion, all agree that statutes
implemented to protect consumer health, safety, or welfare provide a
baseline standard for fair and proper merchant conduct. 196 If a statute was
enacted to protect consumers, whether by requiring certain features on
products or by limiting the access of goods to certain types of persons,
failure to follow the substantive requirements of the law can result in a
UDAP violation.
Indeed, this is true even where the statute does not specifically apply
to the seller at issue. So long as the UDAP statute sets the general standard
for trade, sales by a specific seller not included for various technical
reasons, may still be unfair.197 This has been recognized in instances where
retailers are forbidden from making certain sales under the UDAP statute,
but wholesalers are not. In such circumstances, the wholesaler's failure to
meet the standard can still violate the UDAP statute.198 It is also unfair for
commercial sellers to offer a good that can only be used for illegal
purposes.' 99 Given the prophylactic nature of UDAP statutes and their
focus on preventing the development of unfair practices, extensions such
as these are both prudent and expected. Where statutes already set
guideposts for acceptable business behavior, failure by professional sellers
to follow these standards will violate UDAP laws.200
ethical rule for attorneys as a basis for UDAP liability); Quincy Cablesystems, Inc. v. Sully's Bar, Inc.,
684 F. Supp. 1138 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that a violation of federal rules regarding cable piracy
violates UDAP). But see People ex rel. Daley v. Grady, 548 N.E.2d 764 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding
that a violation of a licensing statute is not necessarily a UDAP law violation, because the legislature
incorporated certain statutes.).
196 See, e.g., Kingston Square, 792 F. Supp. at 1575; Winston Realty Inc. v. G.H.G., Inc.,
331 S.E.2d 677 (N.C. 1985); Gabriel v. O'Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 494 & n.20 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). But
cf. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. art. 2, § 17.43 (West 1999) (stating that Texas rejects per se UDAP
liability for statutory violations).
197 See, e.g., Karst v. Goldberg, 623 N.E.2d 1348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the sale
of a satellite dish with the knowledge of illegal use could violate the UDAP law even though the
consumer, not the seller, would be violating the law); Celebrezze v. United Research, Inc., 482 N.E.2d
1260 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (holding that a collection agency could not avoid liability because it
assigned claims).
198 See, e.g., FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); American Shooting
Sports Council v. Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899 (Mass. 1999).
199 See Karst, 623 N.E.2d 1348. Several of the above principles, relying on an express
statutory prohibition as the basis for public policy to reach the conduct of persons beyond the explicit
reach of the statute, are relevant to the municipality suits against gun manufacturers and sellers. Rather
than simply seek to shut down gun sellers who peddle guns that are illegal in a given jurisdiction, the
cities have sought to reach the manufacturers who allegedly conspire to flood restricted markets with
illegal guns. See, e.g., Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. X06-CV-99-0153198S, 1999 WL
1241909 (Conn. Super. Ct.) (order dated Dec. 10, 1999) (dismissing Bridgeport suit).
200 Even if the UDAP law reached only the sellers that are specified in the substantive
statutes, the question of whether a violation of law is also a violation of the UDAP law is not an
irrelevant one. As a consumer protection tool, UDAP law is often far more effective than the
enforcement mechanisms of other statutes. Non-UDAP statutes may entail heightened proof
requirements, limited remedies, or procedural hurdles that do not hinder civil enforcement under
UDAP law. UDAP laws offer an alternative enforcement mechanism, especially for criminal statutes
that are enacted to protect consumers. See Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748 (Mass. 1974).
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(iv) Tying Together the Advanced Principles of Unfairness
The three principles of unfairness, derived by state courts after
considerable case-by-case adjudication of UDAP issues, each address
somewhat different issues. The "implied warranty" principle concerns
mainly the sale of shoddy items that do not work or at goods that fail to
meet even minimum standards of trade. The "duty to protect" principle
addresses the sale of unreasonably dangerous items. Finally, the "violation
of law" principle reaffirms that merchants must follow existing legal
standards, even if for practical or procedural reasons those standards are
not explicitly enforceable against them. Each of these principles supports
the application of UDAP statutes to the sale of unsafe consumer products.
Below, we briefly analyze how each principle applies on its own and how
together, the principles demonstrate that sales of unsafe consumer products
are unfair under state law.
The application of the first principle, implied warranty, is rather
straightforward. Cases decided under this principle show that it is unfair to
sell goods that do not work properly and are not fit for the purpose for
which they are generally used. Many unsafe product sales fall squarely
within such parameters. Foremost are those goods that are unsafe when
they fail to operate. Fire extinguishers, smoke alarms, firearms, and safety
gear all stand as examples of consumer items that are most unsafe when
they fail to perform when needed. Moreover, one can argue that the
implied warranty principle also applies to goods that contain a defect or
malfunction that poses a risk of harm. There are cases indicating that this
risk of danger makes the goods unfit for the purpose for which they are
generally used.'O°
While the "implied warranty" principle provides clear application of
UDAP to certain types of unsafe products (for instance, those that
malfunction), arguably its application becomes less clear with respect to
products that work but lack childproofing or other safety devices to guard
against misuse. Here, the second relevant principle developed by state
courts comes into play. As noted in Part II.B.3.b.(ii), sellers have a duty to
prevent unnecessary risks of harm to their customers. As in Whelihan v.
Markowski2 °2 and other tort decisions, a seller must make a reasonable
effort to provide a safe product to his customers. So long as the seller is
Using UDAP law instead of a criminal statute, the attorney general can bring a preemptive, injunctive
suit to stop unlawful conduct while it is still nascent. The attorney general also can prove his or her
case by a preponderance of the evidence without having to show criminal law elements such as
scienter. If the attorney general discovers the unfair practice well after it has begun, he or she can seek
substantial penalties under the UDAP statute, which may offer a more substantial sanction than that
afforded by the underlying criminal statute.
201 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Johnson Insulation, 682 N.E.2d 1323, 1330 (Mass. 1997).
202 638 N.E.2d 927 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). Whelihan also is a "duty of law" case.
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aware of the risks and can economically design around them, he is under
an obligation to do so.z°3 While this principle might be of little use in the
smoke detector/fire extinguisher case, it is directly on point for dangerous
goods that fail to include basic safety devices.204 This is particularly true in
the area of childproofing, where UDAP laws may impose a heightened
burden on the seller.
Although the combination of the warranty and unreasonable danger
principles cover much of the product safety arena, they are further
supplemented by the third UDAP unfairness principle. In instances where
factual issues remain concerning the safety of a device or where
countervailing considerations make the reasonableness of product design
debatable, existing statutes can provide guideposts as to appropriate
commercial conduct. In some instances, states may already have statutory
requirements in place relating to product safety.20 5 Although the nature of
those statutes (or gaps in their coverage) may make it difficult to enforce
them in a practicable way,206 they still provide substantive standards that
can be enforced through UDAP statutes. Based on the third relevant
unfairness principle, an attorney general can act to enforce these standards
without having to rely on the existing two-tiered consumer product safety
net. The third principle reaffirms the idea that UDAP statutes can be used
to oversee product specifications whenever prospective standards have
been properly established.
As developed by state courts under state UDAP laws, the three
principles of unfairness noted above demonstrate that it is unfair for
commercial merchants to sell unsafe or defective consumer goods. This
UDAP development has critical implications for goods that escape
effective federal CPSC regulation (i.e., by statutory exemption) and also
fall into areas of lessened tort protection (products subject to public policy
debate, products that require skill to handle, and complex products used in
complex circumstances).20 7
However, these developments in the substantive scope of unfairness
alone do not provide a way to patch the holes in the existing federal safety
net. UDAP statutes, in their most traditional form, require case-by-case
litigation. In such litigation, a UDAP claim against an unsafe product will
203 See supra notes 180-84.
204 It also bolsters the "implied warranty" principle, by providing a further basis for the
concept that the sale of goods with harmful defects is unfair.
205 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.186 (West 1994) (limiting ways linseed oil products
may be made).
206 For instance, the statutes might be criminal, thus entailing a rigorous level of proof and
requiring intent. Alternatively, a statute might bar certain retail sales but not prevent wholesalers from
providing errant retailers with the goods in question. The civil nature of UDAP laws and the ability of
an attorney general to obtain injunctions based on UDAP law UDAP laws to make more effective use
of these substantive standards than the statutory frameworks that include them.
207 See supra Part I.C.
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be subject to many of the same vagaries, obstacles, and fortuitous
circumstances as tort suits. However, if used in combination with another
set of developments in UDAP administrative law, the unfairness doctrine
provides a viable solution to the current product safety dilemma. By
applying their broadly worded regulatory powers under UDAP statutes,
state attorneys general can establish standards for products that fall
through the federal safety net. This solution provides an approach that
protects consumers, provides notice to businesses, and is acceptable to the
courts.
C. Attorney General UDAP Regulations as a Means To Implement
Protections Against the Sale of Defective and Dangerous Goods
The state statutory schemes designed to combat unfair and deceptive
commercial conduct almost uniformly provide for both private remedies
and government enforcement actions brought by state attorneys general. °8
Twenty-seven states couple the attorney general's litigation authority with
some specific reference to the attorney general's administrative authority
to write rules or regulations under the UDAP statute. 209 As noted in Part
II.A, the meaning of these references has been in dispute, with some
UDAP opponents arguing that the statutory language merely allows
attorneys general to set standards for administration of UDAP statutes
procedurally, to add structure to prosecutorial discretion, or to provide
interpretive and nonbinding guidance to the business community.
21°
In the twenty or more years since state legislatures authorized UDAP
administrative rules, the courts have developed the role of regulations by
the attorney general. This Section shows that, consistent with the
development of administrative law principles over the same time, courts
generally have held that an attorney general's regulatory power is
substantive, not merely interpretive, and extends to detailed regulations
setting forth standards for commercial conduct. This refinement of the role
of UDAP regulations, coupled with the developments discussed above
regarding the substantive reach of UDAP statutes, has opened the door for
attorneys general to establish UDAP standards for product safety.
Typical UDAP statutes authorize the attorney general to promulgate
"all rules and regulations necessary to implement and enforce this act" 21,
208 See UDAP, supra note 105, app. A (describing all fifty states' UDAP statutes, including
government enforcement remedies).
209 See id.
210 See Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d at 303 (Mass. 1980) (noting
similar industry arguments). Word choices by some legislatures may have encouraged such
interpretations. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-5 (1999) (authorizing rules to "administer and
enforce" the UDAP statute).
211 W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107 (1999) (noting that the Attorney General may adopt
295
Yale Journal on Regulation
or to issue regulations "interpreting" the UDAP act 212 Standing alone, the
language of delegation does not clearly indicate a substantive role for
UDAP regulations. For instance, these standard statutory delegations do
not state whether attorney general regulations are to establish substantive
rather than internal procedural standards or whether regulations may set
forth detailed instead of generalized rules for commercial conduct. Thus,
as with the meaning of "unfairness," case law developments played a key
role in the delegation language of UDAP statutes.
The threshold question faced by courts regarding attorney general
regulatory power was whether UDAP statutes authorized attorneys general
to establish substantive standards in the first instance. Where UDAP
statutes authorized rules necessary to "enforce" or "implement" the statute,
persons seeking to avoid new regulations asked courts to limit rulemaking
to internal procedural rules concerning attorney general enforcement.
2 13
This argument was urged in various fields through the 1970s, as new state
214
and federal agencies were created to regulate certain areas of commerce.
By that time, the judiciary already had accepted administrative agencies as
the so-called fourth branch of government, and it had made clear that the
delegation of administrative authority could include quasi-legislative
power to issue binding standards, far beyond the power simply to govern
the agency's internal procedures.215 In the UDAP context, courts facing
such a challenge held that the state attorney general had quasi-legislative
power reaching beyond procedural matters.21 6
This reasoning applied even to UDAP statutes that only authorized
regulations necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of the UDAP statute); see also R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 6-13.1 to .7(c) (noting that the Attorney General may promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary).
212 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (1997); see also ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.491
(Michie 1998).
213 See, e.g., United Consumers Club Inc., v. Attorney Gen., 456 N.E.2d 856 (IlI. App. Ct.
1983) (holding that the UDAP provision permits substantive rules, not merely procedural ones).
214 See CHARLES H. KOCH JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE §1.4 (2d ed. 1997)
(discussing the 1970's expansion of "quality of life" administrative agencies and regulations). During
that period, federal courts reaffirmed that Congress was permitted to delegate to administrative
agencies the power to issue substantive, or "legislative," rules. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973) (granting power sufficient to authorize substantive
rulemaking); National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (granting
substantive rulemaking authority to the FTC); see also Ponderosa Ridge LLC v. Banner County, 554
N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 1996) (permitting delegation of substantive rulemaking by state statute).
215 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 757 (1986) ("[lI]t is well settled that Congress may
delegate legislative power to independent agencies or to the Executive, and thereby divest itself of a
portion of its lawmaking power .... "); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary,
capricious, or are manifestly contrary to the statute.").
216 See e.g., United Consumers Club v. Attorney Gen., 456 N.E.2d 856 (III. App. Ct. 1983);
Fenwick v. Kay Am. Jeep, Inc., 371 A.2d 13 (N.J. 1977).
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the attorney general to promulgate guidelines "interpreting" the prohibition
on unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Defendants subjected to new
regulations contended that administrative "interpretations," by the plain
meaning of the governing statutes, could only serve as guidelines, not
prohibitions equivalent to law. 17 However, that argument fell prey to the
general trend in administrative law holding that the power to "define" or
"interpret" meant that such interpretations had the force and effect of
law.21 Landmark cases in Massachusetts and New Jersey, followed by
other states, held that UDAP regulations were not merely instructive or
interpretive, but could set the standards for unfairness.2 1 9 Consequently,
the violation of properly promulgated regulations constituted an unfair and
deceptive act in violation of the UDAP statute, subjecting the wrongdoer
to UDAP remedies.22°
Once UDAP regulations were granted the force and effect of law, the
next layer in the judicial interpretation of UDAP regulatory authority
concerned the specificity of regulations-that is, whether UDAP statutes
permitted explicit standards for a given area of business. The initial
attorney general forays into rulemaking typically established merely
general precepts of deception and unfairness. For instance, several state
attorney generals promulgated regulations stating that the failure to
disclose material information to customers was an unfair or deceptive
act. 22' When regulators began reaching beyond general precepts to define
specific prohibited conduct in particular areas, targets of regulation
objected. Seizing on both the language of delegation and the general nature
217 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1980); Pet
Dealers Ass'n v. Division of Consumer Affairs, 373 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
218 The Supreme Court has upheld the delegation of authority to administrative agencies to
provide the details of what conduct is prohibited under the statute. See Zenel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see also United States v. Henry, 136 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.
1998) (upholding delegation whereby agency "defines" the meaning of hazardous waste).
219 See Casielles v. Taylor, 645 F.2d 498, 501 (1981) (violation of regulation per se violates
act); Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297; Jiries v. BP Oil, 682 A.2d 1241 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1996); see also OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1999) (making unlawful any unfair practice as defined by
attorney general regulations); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-7(c) (1992) (stating that rules have force of
law); Kingston Square Tenants Ass'n. v. Tuskegee Gardens, Ltd., 792 F. Supp. 1566 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(holding that the law at issue was definitively interpreted by regulation). But see Minnesota-Dakotas
Retail Hardware Ass'n v. State, 279 N.W.2d 360, 363-65 (Minn. 1979) (interpreting legislative grant
of rulemaking authority and holding that Consumer Services Commission's rules are interpretive only,
without effect of law, and must be applied to specific facts in each case).
220 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297; State v. Weller, 327 N.W. 2d 172 (Wisc.
Ct. App. 1982). This does not mean, of course, that UDAP violations exist only where a specific rule
or regulation has been violated; administrative regulations are not the exclusive source of violations.
See Department of Legal Affairs v. Father & Son Moving & Storage Inc., 643 So.2d 22 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1994).
221 See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 3.05 (1999) (prohibiting misrepresentations and
failures to disclose material information to consumers). Other regulations commonly adopted by
attorneys general govern door-to-door sales, bait and switch advertising, comparison price advertising,
and refunds. See UDAP, supra note 105, app. A.
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of UDAP statutes, which provide an open-ended prohibition rather than
explicit standards for conduct, defendants argued that an attorney general
could establish only regulations setting forth general principles, and that
only the courts can apply such principles to specific courses of conduct.
222
Courts also rejected these efforts to restrict UDAP regulation, holding that
UDAP regulations could identify specific unfair. As noted by one state
supreme court: "The Attorney General is not constrained to propose
abstract definitions of the words 'unfair' and 'deceptive;' rather, he is to
identify particular business practices within their scope."223 This
conclusion is consistent with the many UDAP statutes that codify specific
conduct as unfair and deceptive in non-exclusive lists set forth in the
224
statute.
Indeed, courts made clear that the attorney general could investigate
and determine standards for commercial conduct sua sponte and did not
need to wait for a court to announce an unfairness principle. For instance,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court specifically rejected the notion
that "legally binding interpretations of 'unfair' and 'deceptive' must be
made in the first instance by [the courts] .,,22' As envisioned by those
twenty-seven statutes authorizing regulations, the attorney general is the
judiciary's equal in developing and defining the prohibition on unfairness
and deception contained in UDAP statutes.226
A final important development in UDAP regulatory jurisprudence
involves the scope of the rulemaking authority. The key remaining
question was whether state attorneys general could write specific
222 See e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297.
223 Id. at 306; see also Fenwick v. Kay AM. Jeep. Inc., 371 A.2d 13 (N.J. 1977); Amato v.
General Motors Corp., 463 N.E.2d 625 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).
224 Some UDAP statutes expressly provide that the list of specific prohibited conduct is not
exclusive. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.02(B) (Anderson 1993). Other statutes have been
so interpreted by the courts. See Legg v. Castruccio, 642 A.2d 906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994) (holding
that list in the Maryland UDAP statute is not exhaustive). This open-ended approach towards
rulemaking authority comports with the FTC's parallel, albeit somewhat more limited, regulatory
authority under its own federal enabling legislation. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (1994) (authorizing the FTC
to prescribe both "A) interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce ... and B) rules which define with specificity acts
or practices which are unfair or deceptive..." ).
225 Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 306.
226 See Normand Josef Enters. v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 646 A.2d 1289 (Conn. 1994)
(holding that courts and the administrative body are on the same footing in developing a statute);
Luskin's, Inc. v. Consumer Protection Div., 657 A.2d 788 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (holding that the
Attorney General, through cease and desist orders, and the courts, have concurrent jurisdiction over
UDAP law violations); Slaney v. Westwood Auto Inc., 322 N.E.2d 768, 773 (Mass. 1975) (holding
that the Attorney General's interpretation of the UDAP statute by regulation complements
development through litigation in the courts). But see Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 396 A.2d 1385, 1388
(Vt. 1979) ("Merchants have a right to test, in a court of law, whether, in fact, warranties have been
violated. This may cause injury to consumers but not through any unfairness, and it is only when
unfairness is involved that the Act gives the Attorney General the authority to make rules and
regulations relating to it.").
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regulations addressing any area of unfairness, or whether the attorney
general's authority was limited only to certain traditional types of unfair
practices. The UDAP case law fully supports a broad application of the
regulatory provisions. Wherever UDAP unfairness can reach, an attorney
general may regulate.22 This conclusion comports with general principles
of administrative law, which determine the scope of regulatory authority
by reviewing the substance of the organic statute and its purpose.22
Further, the decision to enforce law through litigation or by
substantive rulemaking is generally not governed by limitations in
regulatory authority but, lies within the discretion of the administrative
agency. 229 UDAP statutes are undeniably, and purposefully, 230 broad and
flexible in scope,231 and the delegations of regulatory authority in those
statutes are similarly broad.232
The conclusion is also reasonable from a policy perspective. A broad
delegation of regulatory authority permits an agency to define more
precisely by regulation the nature of the prohibited conduct.233 Through
delegation, legislatures recognize "the necessity of administrative
flexibility to prevent the abuses which the [statute] seeks to remedy.1234
Indeed, the value of administrative regulations is greatest where an
agency interprets legislative policy that is only set forth broadly in
227 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297; American Shooting Sports Council v.
Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 902-03 (Mass. 1999). This principle is limited by issues such as
preemption. See infra Part 111.
228 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also Flynn v. Cambridge, 418 N.E.2d 335
(Mass. 1981); Grocery Manufacturers of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 393 N.E.2d 881
(Mass. 1979); Levy v. Board of Registration and Discipline in Med., 392 N.E.2d 792, 801 (Mass.
1979).
229 See e.g., SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); Zachs v. Department Pub. Utils.,
547 N.E.2d 28, 31 (Mass. 1989) ("Administrative agencies may establish policy through either
adjudicative proceedings or rulemaking.").
230 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 303 (holding that the Massachusetts UDAP
statute was intentionally phrased broadly).
231 See cases cited supra note 116.
232 See, e.g., OiIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05(B)(2) (Anderson 1993) ("The Attorney
General may adopt, amend and repeal substantive rules defining with reasonable specificity acts or
practices that violate [the UDAP law prohibition on unfair or deceptive acts or practices]... "). State
administrative law often has surveyed statutory grants of administrative authority and remarked that
legislatures are well aware of the difference between a broad delegation of regulatory authority and a
narrowly-cabined delegation. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Department of Pub. Health, 393
N.E.2d 881 (Mass. 1979); Levy v. Board of Registration and Discipline in Med., 392 N.E.2d 1036
(Mass. 1979); Consolidated Cigar Corp. v. Department of Pub. Health, 364 N.E.2d 1202 (Mass. 1977).
233 See Grocery Mfrs., 393 N.E.2d at 886.
234 Consolidated Cigar, 364 N.E.2d at 1210; see also Commonwealth v. Diaz, 95 N.E.2d
666, 668 (Mass. 1950) (holding that the legislature may delegate to an agency the "working out of
details" of a policy adopted by the legislature); Tosto v. Pennsylvania Nursing Home Loan Agency,
331 A.2d 198, 203-04 (Pa. 1975); State v. City of Auburn, 510 P.2d 647, 653-54 (Wash. 1973). An
agency has considerable flexibility in interpreting a statute which it is charged with enforcing. See
Scofield v. Berman & Sons, Inc., 469 N.E.2d 805 (Mass. 1984); Grocery Manufacturers, 393 N.E.2d
at 886.
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235governing statutes. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has noted,
"[t]he prudent administrative body, being mindful of the scrutiny given to
rules of general application established in ad hoc adjudication, should
proceed by rulemaking where possible and practical. 236
This point was understood by state legislatures, which, in their efforts
to establish a flexible and forward-looking statutory scheme to combat
commercial unfairness, granted state attorneys general a primary
enforcement role through both litigation and regulation.237 The power to
issue substantive regulations furthers the oft-repeated UDAP goal of
reaching ever-changing business practices. It harmonizes with the
comprehensive and flexible approach to consumer protection embodied in
state UDAP laws. A more narrow interpretation of the regulatory authority
would limit such flexibility and undercut the consumer protection
principles that animate the UDAP statute. 239
Nonetheless, manufacturers of potentially unsafe products seeking to
avoid state regulation could frame this issue much differently. They could
contend that had legislatures intended to empower the attorney general to
regulate novel areas of unfairness (such as defective products), they surely
would have so stated. These protests, however, ignore the essential
characteristics of the state UDAP statutes, as well as the fundamental
precepts of administrative law that are discussed above. In addition, two
other basic factors undercut this objection to UDAP regulatory authority.
First, as discussed in Part II.B.1, UDAP laws are remedial statutes
that are purposefully flexible and preventative. They are to address both
unspecified, existing wrongs and "as-yet undevised" practices that injure
consumers. Thus, the legislatures could not have known specifically what
235 See Springfield School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 287 N.E.2d 438, 442 n.23 (Mass.
1972) (quoting NLRB v. Wyman Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 775-80 (1969)).
236 SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). Generally, however, state
administrative law has been slower than federal law in rejecting the nondelegation doctrine. See
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 3.14-.15 (1978).
237 In fact, the delegations of administrative authority in some UDAP statutes avoid these
interpretation issues. These statutes authorize the state attorney general to "adopt rules that set forth
with specificity the acts or practices" that are unfair or deceptive in violation of the UDAP statute.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.205 (1994); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05 (Anderson 1993);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-5 (1999).
238 See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973); Purity Supreme,
Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 303 (Mass. 1980); Commonwealth v. DeCotis, 316 N.E.2d 748
(Mass. 1974). Thus, regulations may be prospective and preventative. See W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-107
(1998).
239 See supra Part 1.B.1. For cases noting that UDAP laws are to be interpreted liberally, see
State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Larsen v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009
(Conn. 1995); Standish v. Hub Motor Co., 254 S.E.2d 416 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); Western Acceptance
Corp., Inc. v. Jones, 788 P.2d 214 (Idaho 1990); Hoke v. Beck, 587 N.E.2d 4 (II1. App. Ct. 1992);
Boubelic v. Liberty State Bank, 553 N.W. 2d 393 (Minn. 1996); Roosevelt Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Crider, 722 S.W.2d 325 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991); and State v.
Therrien, 633 A.2d 272 (Vt. 1993).
300
Vol. 17:253, 2000
Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net
areas would fall within the purview of unfairness. Therefore, it would have
been impossible for them to specify each such area and explicitly indicate
that regulatory powers applied to that situation.
Second, there is no principled basis to prevent UDAP regulatory
power from reaching certain sub-groupings of unfair practices. To limit
artificially UDAP regulatory authority to substantive areas somehow more
narrow than the statute itself would require an analysis of regulatory
authority unique to UDAP and different from the administrative delegation
analysis conducted for all other agencies. UDAP statutes themselves
foreclose such a distinct analysis, as the majority expressly incorporate the
standards of state administrative procedure acts for reviewing
administrative regulations. 240 As a result, manufacturers cannot
convincingly contend that the absence of express authority to regulate
consumer goods forecloses product safety regulation. That interpretation
ignores the developed administrative law-incorporated into UDAP
statutes by the legislature or the courts-which rejects such a stringent
view of regulatory authority.24' Accordingly, an attorney general need not
point to language in the UDAP statute expressly authorizing regulations to
define defective or unsafe products and to regulate their sale.242
Indeed, as noted previously, courts hearing challenges to state UDAP
regulations have recognized that the attorney general can reach via
regulation all matters of unfairness that fall within the purview of UDAP
prohibitions.243 Moreover, they have declined to adopt a standard of
review for attorney general regulations different than that for other agency
regulations. 44 Generally, UDAP regulations will be upheld so long as they
address a matter of potential unfairness or deception and do so in a
reasonable way.245 Product regulations are neither subject nor entitled to a
different standard of review.
The prohibition on unfair conduct has been understood to reach the
sale of defective and unsafe products,246 and UDAP regulatory authority
240 See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.491 (Michie 1998); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1345.05(F) (Anderson 1993). Where the statutes do not expressly provide, courts have concluded that
the standard for review of consumer protection regulations is identical to that of other administrative
regulations. See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 303.
241 Generally, administrative regulations will be upheld so long as they are within the
contours of, and not contradicted by, the express delegation of administrative authority. See, e.g.,
Minnesota-Dakotas Retail Hardware Ass'n v. State, 279 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Minn. 1979).
242 See, e.g.. Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 302. An agency's regulatory powers are "shaped
by its organic statute and need not necessarily be traced to specific words." Commonwealth v.
Cerveny, 367 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1977).
243 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297; American Shooting Sports Council v.
Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899, 902-03 (Mass. 1999).
244 See Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 303.
245 See, e.g., Caldor, Inc. v. Heslin, 577 A.2d 1009, 1014 (Conn. 1990); Purity Supreme, 407
N.E.2d at 306.
246 See cases cited supra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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has been held to allow attorneys general to set specific prospective
standards within the boundaries of unfairness. Thus, the regulation of
defective and unsafe products through specific and generally applicable
safety standards falls squarely within the attorney general's regulatory
power under UDAP statutes. Existing state UDAP statutes provide a way
to regulate the safety of certain products that fall through the product
safety net. The next Part analyzes the utility of this state tool.
III. Evaluation of UDAP Regulations as a Solution To Address Unsafe or
Defective Products That Fall Through the Safety Net
As noted in the previous Part, the recent confluence of developments
in UDAP and administrative law provides an opportunity for a state
attorney general to fill holes in the product safety net through UDAP
regulation. The question remains whether an attorney general should use
such regulatory authority. Below, we address normative and practical
issues posed by the application of UDAP regulatory power in this context.
While these issues present challenges for agency officials, practical
experience both with prior actions by attorneys general and with the prior
use of administrative power generally countenances against overvaluing
these concerns. None provide a sound reason to abandon the development
and use of this new consumer protection tool.
A. Whether Generalized Rulemaking Loses the Benefit of an Evolving
Standard for Commercial Unfairness
As discussed in Part II.B.1, one of the core values of the UDAP
prohibition on "unfair and deceptive" acts and practices is that it creates a
standard that evolves over time.247 Case-by-case litigation permits this
development by allowing each questioned act or practice to be analyzed in
real-life contexts. The litigation approach to a particular commercial
practice-including the sale of an unsafe product-does not demand the
complete answer to an industry-wide issue. Rather, like the common law
generally, the ongoing process of judicial inclusion and exclusion permits
the UDAP standard to be continuously refined.248
It can be argued that an attorney general is short-circuiting this well-
247 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 306 (holding that the open ended language of the
UDAP law allows it to reach as yet undevised practices); Gennari v. Weichert Co., 691 A.2d 350, 364(N.J. 1997) (stating that the history of UDAP law is one of continuous expansion); Commonwealth v.
Monumental Properties, Inc., 329 A.2d 812, 816-817 (Pa. 1974) (holding that the UDAP statute is an
"adaptable tool for protection of public interest"); see also American Fin. Serv. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957,
965-72 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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established process by creating regulations. Rather than allowing
experience to serve as a developmental guide, the attorney general will be
setting standards that apply across an array of situations, most of which
have never arisen and many of which have not been foreseen. Whether this
greatly increases the chance that the standard will be in error, and whether
an area as important as product safety deserves a more cautious approach,
are questions that any attorney general would do well to consider
seriously.
However, a serious review counsels in favor of a regulatory approach
for several reasons. First, in analyzing the route to a standard, one must not
only look at the risks and potential harms generated by the regulatory
approach, but also at the risks and harms generated by case-by-case
development. Where the issue at stake is the sale of defectively dangerous
products, delays in implementing safety standards will yield increased
injuries. The tort approach to gradually promoting safe products requires
victims to bring personal injury or wrongful death actions. In an area like
childproofing handguns, an evolving standard reached through litigation
will necessarily be built on the bodies of innocent consumers. By the time
a case-by-case approach has addressed the plethora of possibilities
inherent in product design issues, a great many interim victims will need to
have adjudicated their individual cases. A regulatory standard, developed
more on projected dangers and possible risks, circumvents the accidental
injuries that are inherent in that evolutionary adjudicative methodology.
Second, when considering which vehicle for creating standards will
better analyze the factual risks and possible consequences of design
decisions, it is important to ask how each approach weighs and reviews the
relevant data. In an evolving adjudicatory methodology, the essential
inquiry is often one of causation or some other fortuitous issue necessary
to establish liability (e.g., comparative negligence, proximate cause,
obviousness of danger, privity, standing, or admissibility of evidence).249
In contrast, the regulatory process can focus completely on the safety of
the product and the costs and benefits of possible design solutions to user
risks. From this perspective, the exercise of rulemaking authority is far
superior to the evolution of product safety standards through litigation.250
Finally, in comparing the regulatory approach to the case-by-case
development of standards, it is also important to view the issues from the
perspective of potential defendant sellers. While UDAP regulation of
249 See, e.g., Wasylow v. Glock, 975 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass 1996) (dismissing a product
liability case for lack of causation); McCarthy v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 916 F. Supp. 370 (D. Mass.
1996) (holding that a criminal act is a superseding cause); State v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490
(Minn. 1996) (rejecting tort claims for lack of standing).
250 Further, UDAP regulations also may be further honed over time as circumstances
warrant, so that the valued flexibility of case-by-case development is not really lost. See. e.g., Purity
Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 308 (Mass. 1980).
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 17:253, 2000
product safety, in contrast to tort litigation, ultimately diminishes a
manufacturer's opportunities to avoid liability if it sells defective goods,25'
it also provides certainty and prospective guidance.252 Sellers and
manufacturers know prospectively what is expected of them and can plan
accordingly. Indeed, prospective standards replace post hoc enforcement
suits by the attorney general. When viewed as an alternative to post hoc
UDAP suits for penalties/injunctions, UDAP product regulations promote
fairness to businesses. 253 As courts have oft stated, when an agency is
authorized to enforce a law through both regulation and litigation, the
agency is wise to fill in the interstices of the statute through rulemaking to
"simplify the process" and "advance the orderly conduct of business., 254
That edict is particularly true in the context of promoting product safety,
where a case-by-case evolution of product standards carries an
unacceptable human price. Thus, lessened consumer risk, more-focused
standard-setting, and even prospective fairness to sellers all favor using the
regulatory approach.255
251 Case-by-case adjudication depends heavily on issues of proof related to incident-specific
causation. The inability of a plaintiff to make such causal connections will absolve the defendant, even
if the defective nature of the product is otherwise beyond question. See supra Part I.C.2.
252 Courts have acknowledged that prospective regulations offer a degree of fairness to
business persons not readily achieved through post hoc litigation; regulations "mitigat[e] [the] possible
vagueness" of UDAP statutes that were "intentionally left open-ended .. " Purity Supreme, 407
N.E.2d at 307; see also Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. at 365-66 (1973). The
Alaska Supreme Court, in affirming judgment for the attorney general in a UDAP statute enforcement
action, stated:
Substantive rulemaking is an invaluable adjunct to purely adjudicative proceedings
because it shortens and simplifies the process and advances the orderly conduct of
business .... We think that it would be the better practice for the Attorney General
to exercise his discretionary rulemaking power to fill in the interstices of the
Alaska [Unfair Trade Practices] Act rather than relying exclusively on
adjudication.
State v. O'Neill Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520, 534 n.49 (Alaska 1980).
253 Under a regulatory regime, a manufacturer that violated the regulations would still face
court action, but such a suit would simply seek to hold the company to account for breaking
established standards. Absent regulations, an attorney general's suit would likely seek to impose a
standard that had never formally been applied, and might not have existed at the time the product was
manufactured).
254 O'Neill, 609 P.2d at 534 n.49.
255 Even though regulations provide these benefits, a question arises as to whether they also
might impinge on traditional tort rights of accident victims. For instance, defendants might argue that
the regulations set the ceiling for required conduct. While there is some danger that regulations could
be construed as foreclosing tort suits, regulatory standards are not generally considered to alter
common law tort principles by implication. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288C (1965). A
more novel question arises regarding whether a UDAP regulation can preclude a private UDAP statute
suit seeking to hold a defendant to an even higher standard. While this theoretical issue is beyond the
scope of this Article, the practical problem is unlikely to arise. Attorneys general could likely craft
their regulations so as to keep such private rights intact. Cf infra Part III.E (discussing the possibility
that regulations may actually catalyze private actions).
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B. Whether Regulations Rob Manufacturers of Their Day in Court
Traditional application of a UDAP statute to a product seller allows
that defendant the opportunity to show a fact-finder the full context of its
behavior and accords the seller ample opportunity to demonstrate that its
behavior was not unfair.25 6 It can be argued that this rudimentary right is
not available (at least in the traditional form) under a regulatory regime.
Once regulations are in place, the unfairness of an act is specifically
defined. Circumstance and context lose their relevance to some extent, and
the seller necessarily loses some of the sympathy that would inevitably be
present if the standard were crystallized post hoc. While the seller may still
contest the standard, his position in court and his defense of his conduct
are altered. It is important to consider whether some element of fairness is
lost in the regulatory framework.
While these essentially tactical changes might raise a fairness concern
in some circumstances, they do not do so here. Indeed, fairness counsels
for, not against, a regulatory approach to product safety. Would-be
defendants in litigation do not lose their day in court under a regulatory
approach. Manufacturers affected by a UDAP product regulation not only
can still challenge the regulation when it is applied to them and their
conduct, but they also can challenge the standard more generically while it
is being promulgated (by participating in the hearing process) and
immediately (by bringing a declaratory judgment or administrative
challenge). Although a regulation that results from the proper
administrative process is accorded deference, it still must be the right
standard, one that is reasonably related to its goal of preventing the sale of
defective products.257 A manufacturer or seller has ample opportunity to
challenge the proffered regulatory standard and argue that it is incorrect.
Indeed, the focus of the sellers' "day in court" on this issue will be the
product standard itself and whether it is reasonable. 258 As discussed in Part
I.C.2, tort adjudication diverts much litigative effort to other causal and
procedural issues. A regulatory challenge can avoid these distractions,
256 See Christie v. Dalmig, Inc., 396 A.2d 1385, 1388 (Vt. 1979) (noting that, at least where
unfairness is absent or unclear, "merchants have a right to test, in a court of law, whether, in fact,
warranties have been violated"). Negligence cases allow for a defendant to raise the exact context in
which his product was created, and also allow him to explore issues such as the purpose for the
product and likely consumer expectations. See, e.g., Rhodes v. R.G. Industries, Inc., 325 S.E.2d 465
(Ga. Ct. App. 1984). This is true as well for many actions brought in strict liability. See. e.g.,
Culpepper v. Weihrauch, 991 F. Supp. 1397 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
257 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 304-06; Dalmig, 396 A.2d at 1387-88.
Moreover, this raises another fairness benefit of the regulatory approach. While an attorney general
could commence a suit under any non-frivolous conception of "unfairness," he can only seek to impose
a standard of conduct via regulations after a lengthy and rigorous hearing and comment process, which
should cull any ill-conceived notions from the proposed standard. Thus, the seller is saved from having
to defend against more extreme (and potentially less justified) demands on his commercial conduct.
258 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, 407 N.E.2d at 297.
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providing a succinct and focused opportunity for a seller to present its
point of view.
Moreover, as noted in the previous Part, any fairness analysis must
consider that an attorney general authorized to issue detailed UDAP
regulations is also empowered to bring enforcement actions to reach the
same unfair commercial conduct. 259 Absent regulations, a defendant's day
in court typically arises post hoc, when a plaintiff seeks to apply a new
standard to a manufacturer's prior conduct. The potential impact of post
hoc standard-setting is particularly acute where an attorney general may
seek civil penalties.26 ° In contrast, regulations seek to remedy unfair
conduct across the industry in a prospective and preventative way, and
only after a regulatory promulgation process. In this light, regulations are a
more moderate and fair use of attorney general enforcement power,
providing not only a "day in court" but also additional opportunities for
input and challenge that are not available to sellers in traditional case-by-
case UDAP enforcement.
C. Whether the Regulatory Process Is Too Cumbersome, Slow, or Costly
The history of state and federal administrative rulemaking
demonstrates that it can take years to issue regulations.261 Indeed, the
promulgation of consumer protection regulations has been a gradual
process, with many state attorneys general issuing only a handful of
regulations after twenty or more years of authority.16' Because new
regulations must comply with state administrative procedure acts, an
attorney general must be willing to commit significant resources to a
lengthy hearing process and review of comments in addition to the drafting
and redrafting of regulations.263 Thus, although regulatory authority
259 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20 (West 1994).
Some states also authorize administrative actions based upon prior conduct. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42-110(m) (West 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-2-6 (1999).
260 Litigation designed to bring change to industry practices often begins with a case against
only one of several players in the industry, which some commentators view as raising its own series of
fairness concerns. See, e.g., John Coffee, Paradigms Lost-The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil
Models-and What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1889 (1992); Bennett Gershman, The
New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 394, 441 (1992). These issues are less pointed in a
regulatory regime, where standards of conduct are published in advance.
261 See DAVIS, supra note 236, at 211-17. For example, following emergency promulgation
of manufactured housing legislation in 1993, which directed the Massachusetts Attorney General to
adopt relevant regulations as necessary, the attorney general began a regulatory process. See MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 32S (West 1995). Final regulations were not promulgated until 1996. See
MASS REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 10.00 (1999). Similarly, the United States Department of Justice was
directed by Congress to promulgate rules for the use of certain investigative subpoena powers. See 31
U.S.C. § 3733(i)(2)(B) (1994). It did not promulgate provisions relevant to related subpoena issues
until 1995. See 60 Fed. Reg. 61290 (1995).
262 See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, §§ 460, 470, 475 (1999).
263 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 30A, §§ 2-6 (West 1995); see also ARTHUR EARL
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provides a means to address a particular industry or practice
comprehensively and prospectively, it still requires a substantial
commitment of resources.
Given the sometimes discouraging history of regulatory
promulgation, as well as the time and resources required to create product
safety regulations, an attorney general would be wise to wonder whether
the process is too cumbersome, slow, and costly to provide the consumer
the relief it promises. While it is undeniable that regulations can be both
time-consuming and expensive, these facts do not necessarily counsel
against taking the UDAP regulatory route. Indeed, the time and expense
can be viewed as serving as a necessary brake on ill-conceived or quickly-
generated ideas that should undergo more serious consideration. These
restraints also ensure that an attorney general will address only the most
pressing consumer issues, while allowing the product safety net to work
without interference in areas where it functions properly.
Moreover, the costs and duration of the regulatory process must be
viewed in comparison with the alternatives of litigation. Use of traditional
adjudicatory methods often leaves consumers without any immediate
protection. While regulations may take years to finalize, enforcement
litigation can take just as long, with little assurance that even successful
litigation will result in the correct standard for product safety.264 Critically,
in light of the various factors on which a judgment for defendants could
turn, one test case, even if successful, is unlikely to affect industry-wide
changes. 265 Multiple suits may be necessary to bring about industry-wide
implementation of standards for safety.266 When compared to litigation, the
regulatory approach to product safety is relatively streamlined,
expeditious, and ultimately less resource intensive.
267
BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING §§ 6.1.1 to 6.19.2 (1986).
264 See supra Part I.C.2.
265 See FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 61, § 1.08. Even when pecuniary liability is
established for a negligently designed product feature, not all manufacturers will adopt the safety
standard that results from the litigation. See id.
266 See ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & MICHAEL ASIMOW, STATE AND FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.3 (1989) (noting how rulemaking brings an immediate uniformity not
usually available during forays into standard-setting by adjudication); see BONFIELD, supra note 263,
at § 4.23.
267 See DAVIS, supra note 236, § 6.7. While the fact gathering and procedural requirements
of the regulatory process vary from state to state and may be resource intensive in some venues, the
cost of multiple enforcement suits against a variety of sellers would no doubt be far greater. Moreover,
by setting forth prospective and detailed standards, the regulatory method ensures that fewer suits will
be needed in the future to ensure that safe practices are followed. Indeed, even if the costs of potential
litigative challenges to the regulations are considered, the regulatory approach still appears to offer a
streamlined path to product safety. See supra Part III.B.
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D. Whether the Attorney General Has the Requisite Expertise To
Regulate Dangerous and Defective Products
Given the intricacies of the consumer product safety field, some
observers might contend that an attorney general lacks the expertise to
regulate products. A legislature, goes the argument, would not have
delegated authority over product safety without ensuring sufficient staffing
and expertise to analyze complex product safety issues. For instance,
compare an attorney general's office with the CPC Federal Consumer
Product Safety Commission, which Congress specifically authorized to
conduct product safety studies and investigations, construct research and
testing facilities, hire scientists, and procure personnel and resources from
other government departments to assist in product safety oversight.
268
While this argument may have a superficial appeal, it does not withstand
scrutiny.
An undue focus on attorney general expertise in a particular product
area would require that courts analyze UDAP regulatory authority
differently than all other administrative delegations. It is presumed, and in
fact demanded, that all agencies authorized to regulate in a particular
commercial area will attain-through the hearings process and
otherwise- the expertise necessary to promulgate effective regulations.269
The looming threat of judicial review of regulations ensures that agencies
learn enough to issue standards that are consistent with the purpose and
edicts of the statutory delegation and which reasonably achieve their
desired purpose.27 °
Once again, the real undoing of the expertise objection to UDAP
regulations is reached by comparing the expertise employed in the
regulatory context to the expertise that is determinative in the alternative
forum of litigation. In tort and UDAP litigation involving allegations of
dangerous products, non-expert judges or juries make decisions on
appropriate product standards. Not only are these fact-finders without
independent expertise to determine complex issues of product standards,
their sources of information are far more limited than those available to an
administrative body. A judge reaching product safety decisions must rely
on admissible evidence presented by the adversaries and determine an
268 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2054(b), 2076(h), 2077, 2079(e) (1994).
269 See, e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1980).
270 See FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 250-62 (1965). Practical
experience also belies any claim that attorneys general lack sufficient expertise to tackle product safety
issues. For instance, some statutes outside of UDAP specifically direct the attorney general to regulate
public safety issues, such as industrial safety or workplace regulation. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 149, § 6 (West 1995) ("[Tlhe Attorney General may determine what suitable devices or other
reasonable means or requirements for the prevention of industrial or occupational diseases shall be
adopted.") § 13 (the workplace environment may be regulated by the Attorney General).
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answer somewhere between polar opposite views. The administrative
agency, in contrast, can arrive at industry standards after hearing all views
through extensive hearings. 7'
Furthermore, the UDAP statutes themselves specifically set limits on
where the attorney general can apply expertise. State UDAP statutes
usually provide that the attorney general may not regulate a matter if
another agency is authorized to act in the field and has issued a standard
for that conduct.272 Thus, the attorney general may not claim expertise to
act in an area where another agency has regulated pursuant to its authority.
In this way, UDAP statutes guard against expansion of UDAP regulatory
authority to areas where it does not belong. 273 That, in turn, is the only
expertise-based limitation on UDAP authority under the statute.
Entertaining other expertise-based objections to UDAP regulation would
undermine the legislative grant of authority provided in this context.
E. Whether Regulations Will Spawn Harmful Private Litigation
Although the attorney general, as promulgator of UDAP regulations,
has primary responsibility for their enforcement, the matter does not end
there. While responsible companies may welcome oversight from the
attorney general to ensure that all competitors are complying with existing
standards, they may also be concerned that regulations will spawn
vexatious private litigation. Private parties, seeking to act as de facto
private attorneys general, may barrage a seller with lawsuits, seeking either
to advance their own private policy agenda by driving companies from the
marketplace or leverage settlement monies in questionable cases. While
such concerns can be exaggerated, it is important to consider whether
private lawsuits can be or should be avoided in this context.
As an initial matter, it is unlikely that an attorney general can bar
private plaintiffs from relying on regulatory violations as proof of their
private UDAP claims. Most UDAP statutes specifically create a private
cause of action, and provide that private parties that have lost "any money
or property" due to an "unfair act or practice" may sue for damages and
injunctive relief.2 74 Because UDAP regulations specifically set standards
271 Thus, the regulatory process is better suited for setting complex industry-wide standards
in such circumstances. See BONFIELD & ASIMOW, supra note 266, at § 5.3.
272 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605-.652 (1999).
273 See Williams v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 763 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Pa. 1991)
(finding that the insurance statute offers the exclusive remedy); Carlie v. Morgan, 922 P.2d I (Utah
1996) (holding that the UDAP law does not reach rental property issues because of more specific state
statute). But see Miller v. Kelly, 759 F. Supp. 199 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (ruling that UDAP law claims can
apply to securities transactions, even though a more specific statute also applies); Bisson v. Ward, 628
A.2d 1256 (Vt. 1993) (stating that the landlord/tenant law does not occupy the field, so that UDAP law
applies).
274 OR. REV. STAT. § 646.605 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-19 (1999). But see MiSS.
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for unfairness, violations of those standards can be the "unfair practice"
needed to support a private cause of action. Indeed, UDAP law is replete
with examples of private parties bringing claims based on violations of
attorney general regulations.275
State practice differs from the federal unfairness approach, which
rejects a private right of action. Under the FTC Act, only the FTC itself
may bring an action against a violator.7 6 Although private tort suits may
attempt to use violations of federal unfairness standards as proof of
negligence per se or as an analogy to state unfairness issues, the federal
law does not generally countenance this approach.277
Regardless of which policy choice is correct, state law
straightforwardly holds that the private right of action exists. While an
attorney general might try to specify in his regulations that only he can
enforce them, such an action would no doubt be challenged by private
litigates. Moreover, given that legislatures generally envisioned a private
enforcement presence under UDAP statutes, such an action would likely
be inappropriate. Any attorney general promulgating regulations should be
cognizant of the fact that private citizens will use the prospective
provisions as an aid in their private suits.
This, however, does not mean that law-abiding companies will be
overwhelmed by self-appointed private attorneys general. The private right
of action is limited in a variety of ways. First, private parties can only
bring an action under UDAP statutes if they have themselves directly
suffered from the allegedly unfair practice.278 Private parties cannot bring
an action for violation of regulatory standards without first showing (either
pro se or through their lawyers) that they were directly injured by the
alleged unlawful act.
27 9
CODE ANN. § 75-24-1 (1999) (providing a more limited private right of action).
275 See, e.g., Claude Nolan Cadillac, Inc. v. Griffin, 610 So.2d 725 (Fl. Dist. Ct. App. 1993);
Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 688 (Mont. 1980); Jiries v. B.P. Oil Corp., 682
A.2d 1241, 1243 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996); Vanney v. Capital-Lincoln Mercury Sales, Inc., 623
N.E.2d 177, 183 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); cf. Weigel v. Ron Tonkin Chevrolet Co., 690 P.2d 488, 493
(Or. 1984).
276 See Baum v. Great W. Cities, Inc., 703 F.2d 1197, 1209 (10th Cir. 1983). However,
private parties may bring a suit to enforce consumer product safety rules. See 15 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988).
But cf. Moe v. MTD Prods., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir. 1995).
277 But cf. supra note 32 (noting a limited cause of action available when CPSC regulations
are violated).
278 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 9 (West 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-
133 (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1995).
279 See, e.g., Legg v. Castruccio, 642 A.2d 906 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1994); Levy v. Edmund
Buick-Pontiac Ltd., 637 A.2d 600 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993); Russell v. Atkins, 679 A.2d 333
(Vt. 1996); cf. State v. Philip Morris Inc., 551 N.W.2d 490 (Minn. 1996) (finding no common law
claims for Blue Cross to recover beneficiary's injury costs from tortfeasor). This is not to be confused
with a privity requirement. As a general matter, UDAP statutes and case law have discarded that
limitation. See, e.g., Larsen v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1995); Warren v. LeMay, 491 N.E.2d
464 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986). Thus, a person who is harmed by a product purchased by another may still
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Even if they can pass this threshold, private plaintiffs are limited in
their recovery options. Many states cap UDAP recoveries at actual
damages in a variety of circumstances, 280 and defendants may raise the
usual litigative challenges to losses, including lack of mitigation. UDAP
statutes do allow private parties to collect multiple damages, but usually
only if they can make certain additional showings.8
Finally, it must be remembered that private suits lack the two most
important tools available under UDAP statutes: penalties and pre-suit
investigative subpoenas. The attorney general is specifically authorized to
seek penalties from defendants ranging up to $10,000 per violation.282 As
each sale of a defective item may be a violation of the UDAP statute, the
potential aggregate penalties can be quite serious, even for a large
manufacturer. In addition, an attorney general may investigate a possible
case using compulsory process and, thereby, gather the data needed to
bring a suit even when the relevant information might not otherwise be
publicly available. Because private parties cannot take advantage of either
of these weapons, their ability to bring substantial cases is limited.28 3 The
lack of penalties means that a private party typically cannot seriously harm
a defendant, and the lack of pre-suit compulsory process significantly
reduces the opportunity to develop a case and gather the information
needed to file a suit. As a result, UDAP suits based on regulatory standards
do not provide an attractive vehicle for private parties to harass industry.28 4
recover damages.
280 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-608 (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 9 (West
1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 646.638(1) (1995). Such statutes frequently allow a minimum floor recovery
for an injury caused by a UDAP statute violation in case specific damages are difficult to quantify. See
id.
281 See, e.g., Crooks v. Payless Drug Stores, 592 P.2d 196 (Or. 1979) (holding that punitive
damages are allowed only if aggravating circumstances exist); Winton v. Johnson & Dix Fuel Corp.,
515 A.2d 371 (Vt, 1986) (finding a showing of malice needed for "exemplary" treble damages). In
addition, in some jurisdictions, private plaintiffs must show that their suit will advance a public policy
goal, and that the alleged violation had a wider impact than just the individual transaction between the
seller and the consumer. See. e.g., Burdakin v. Hub Motor Co., 357 S.E.2d 839, 840 (Ga. Ct. App.
1987); Rosa v. Johnston, 651 P.2d 1228, 1232 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982). A small number of states do not
require intent or other preconditions on the award of multiple damages. See, e.g., Marshall v. Miller,
276 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. 1981); Huffmaster v. Robinson, 534 A,2d 435 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986);
see also UDAP, supra note 105, § 8.4.2.
282 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-3.1, :8-13 (West 1989); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-19
(1999).
283 Moreover, unwarranted suits may be deterred by the UDAP provisions in some statutes
that explicitly allow for attorney awards to prevailing defendants. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §
646.638(3)-(4) (1999).
284 To the extent that UDAP laws provide a vehicle for harassment, it is important to note
that the same potential exists without a regulation in place. A private party can currently bring an
action alleging the unfair sale of what it believes is an unsafe product. See, e.g., Maillet v. ATF-
Davidson Co., 552 N.E.2d 95 (Mass. 1990). But see OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.608(4), 646.638(1) (1999)
(cabining private UDAP suits to specified types of unfairness, unless the Attorney General has also
declared the practice unfair by regulation). Regulations add nothing to the potential for frivolous or
unfounded suits. A suit based on a violation of a UDAP regulation necessarily alleges a violation of an
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What UDAP suits based on regulations can do, however, is help
compensate consumers for losses caused by company misdeeds. To the
extent that a consumer was injured by a product that failed to meet product
safety standards, the consumer will be able to make the seller bear the loss.
Given that the standards are applied prospectively, there is no unfairness to
professional sellers. Indeed, private suits provide a service to the state and
to those sellers that obey the law by supplementing the attorney general's
enforcement oversight and enhancing UDAP statute deterrence.
F. Whether Consumers Are Better Off with the Status Quo
Before promulgating any UDAP regulation, an attorney general is
always faced with the question of whether issuing prospective standards
will do more harm than good. While regulations are meant to protect
consumers, they necessarily alter the current interactions between
consumers and sellers. Regulations constrain how sellers can sell their
goods and what they can offer in the marketplace. Costs of compliance
with regulations are likely passed along to consumers. Regulatory
provisions may not keep up with market developments and may hinder
innovation. All of these concerns, along with the possibility that
unskillfully drawn regulations may have unintended negative
consequences, provide reasons to question critically whether regulations
are actually needed in a given situation.
These questions certainly arise in the current context. Product safety
regulations may well constrain consumer choice, raise prices, and hinder
innovation. However, if the standards are reasonable floors for safety, it is
unlikely that the impact will be very great. Moreover, the impact is almost
certainly outweighed by the consumer safety benefits that well-drafted
regulations can provide.
An illustration on this point may be useful. As noted in Part I,
handguns are one set of products that currently fall through the consumer
product safety net. There is essentially no safety regulation of the domestic
handgun market, and only a weak tort deterrent. If reasonable regulations
setting minimum safety standards are applied to handguns, would those
regulations constrain consumer choice, raise prices, and hinder innovation?
It seems unlikely for the following reasons. First, reasonable handgun
safety regulations will take advantage of safety, design, and construction
features already available to handgun producers. In the handgun market,
many handgun manufacturers already use materials and designs of
sufficient quality to prevent accidental discharges and explosions.285
existing prospective standard. Such a suit could hardly be called vexatious.
285 Voluntary testing of handguns confirms this analysis. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE REPORT: 9MM AND .45 CALIBER AUTOLOADING PISTOL TEST RESULTS,
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Similarly, many manufacturers already utilize at least some basic
childproofing mechanisms.286 Such manufacturers could readily comply
with reasonable regulatory requirements if they chose to do so. Thus, the
only limitation on choice would be the elimination of fringe or errant
market players that fail to use existing prevalent technology and readily
available safety mechanisms.
Second, it is unlikely that such regulations would raise prices
significantly. To the extent that major market players produce handgun
models that already meet the standards, there is no reason to believe that
those prices will change.287 All that will happen is that substandard models
will disappear from commercial shelves. However, it is undeniable that the
elimination of certain choices, especially those choices that were the least
expensive (because they provided substandard protections or were
designed cheaply and poorly), will mean that some consumers have to pay
more for a new firearm. However, it is important to remember that the
UDAP regulation will only apply to commercial sellers. A consumer
seeking a very inexpensive weapon can still purchase a used gun from a
hobbyist or, perhaps, depending on the exemptions in the regulations for
existing goods, from a used-gun dealer.288
Third, in the handgun context, there is no evidence that regulation
would hinder innovation,289 so long as the standards are carefully worded
to leave development choices open to manufacturers and the regulator
(1987); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EQUIPMENT PERFORMANCE REPORT: .38 AND .357 CALIBER
REVOLVER TEST RESULTS (1987).
286 See, e.g., SHOOTERS BIBLE 98-204 (1997) (identifying handgun features, including safety
features); President, Handgun Makers Find Common Ground, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at A16
(noting major firearms manufacturers' commitment to provide childproof trigger locks on their
firearms). Numerous manufacturers also have experience with additional user safety devices, which
they have historically included in some of their handgun designs and which are still available on a
variety of models today. See Vemick et al., supra note 11, at 431-33.
287 An argument can be made that removing the cheapest handguns from the market will
reduce their price-constraining influence on the other products for sale. Such a position ignores the
price competition between the remaining makes and models, which should continue to keep prices
down. Cf. Philip Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRJM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 68-69
(1995) (analyzing whether primary market restrictions increase prices of used guns).
288 See. e.g., Young v. Joyce, 351 A.2d 857 (Del. 1975); Billings v. Wilson, 493 N.E.2d 187
(Mass. 1986). But see Singleton v. Pennington, 568 S.W.2d 367 (Tex. App. 1977). In addition, it is
important to keep in mind that many safety devices and design modifications may not greatly increase
the marginal cost of a handgun. However, using dependable materials instead of dangerously defective
ones may substantially increase production costs. See LAWRENCE H. VAN VLACK, ELEMENTS OF
MATERIALS SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 501-40, 556 (6th ed. 1989); GAREN J. WINTEMUTE, RING OF
FIRE: THE HANDGUN MAKERS OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 18-19 (1994); Garen J. Wintemute, The
Relationship Between Firearm Design and Firearm Violence: Handguns in the 1990s, 275 JAMA
1743, 1752 (1996); see also SHOOTERS BIBLE, supra note 286, at 98-204 (listing prices of similarly
equipped handguns made of different materials).
289 The recent history surrounding one innovation, the "smart gun" which operates only for
its user, suggests that the industry may in fact stifle safety innovation absent a regulatory push. See
Paul M. Barrett, Personal Weapon: How a Gun Company Tries to Propel Itself into the Computer Age,
WALL ST. J., May 12, 1999, at Al.
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continues to monitor industrial developments to take new technologies into
account. In the handgun industry, regulation is needed specifically because
certain manufacturers have failed to innovate or even adopt existing
technologies. Current safety advances in this industry are often based on
either federally funded research29° or development programs funded by
large-market players that are focusing on a safe-product market niche.29'
Neither of these types of efforts are likely to be cut back due to state
regulation. By setting the floor at a reasonable level and requiring
nonconforming manufacturers to update their products to modern
standards, state regulators may well provide new opportunities for
inventors and niche-market players that can help these manufacturers
upgrade their products.292 Regulations also may increase consumer
awareness of safety and make it a more important marketing tool for
sellers. If worded properly, regulations need not have any negative impact
on market innovation or otherwise thwart nascent consumer safety
developments.
Even if product regulation for handguns would raise prices, limit
choice, and alter the natural market development path of the handgun
industry, these disadvantages must all be weighed against the benefits that
would accrue from blocking the existing hole in the product safety net. In
the case of handguns, there are over 1500 accidental deaths per year, more
than almost any other consumer product.293 Many of these deaths are not
purchasers but innocent third parties, including young children. Although
estimates vary, thousands of additional accidental injuries occur annually
due to defective or unsafe handguns.294 Simple safety devices or design
changes, many of them available for generations, could prevent these
harms. A study by the General Accounting Office indicated that almost
one-third of the accidental handgun injury fatalities in general, and all such
injuries resulting from young children handling weapons, could be
eliminated by use of simple devices already employed by some industry
290 See, e.g., D. R. WEISS, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, SMART GUN TECHNOLOGY PROJECT
FINAL REPORT (1996).
291 See, e.g., Barrett, supra note 289, at A 1; David B. Ottaway, A Boon to Sales or a Threat?
Safety Devices Split Industry, WASH. POST, May 20, 1999, at Al.
292 See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, There's a Catch, Simple Invention Points Up Complexity of
Gun Control Suits, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 1999, at Al.
293 See 1995 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 26, tbl. 1.
294 See, e.g., J. Annest, National Estimates of Non-Fatal Firearm Related Injuries, 273
JAMA 1749 (1995); N. Sinauer, Unintentional Nonfatal Firearm Related Injuries, 275 JAMA 1740
(1996). In addition, there have been several attempts to quantify the dollar-value damage caused by
handgun injuries. While these estimates vary greatly, it appears that medical expenses alone from
handgun accidents cost over $100 million every year. See. e.g., W. Max, Shooting in the Dark:
Estimating the Cost of Firearms Injuries, HEALTH AFF. 171, 172-81(Winter 1993); Ted R. Miller &
Mark A. Cohen, Costs of Gunshot and Knife Wounds in the U.S. 6-11, tbl. 8 (1993) (unpublished
manuscript on file with the author).
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participants. 295 When faced with such large-scale, preventable carnage, it ishard to argue that no action is the best course.
G. Whether Such Decisions Should Be Left to the State Legislature
Another serious issue that an attorney general must consider is
whether the product safety crisis is a matter better left in the hands of the
state legislature. After all, under the state constitutions, the attorney
general is first and foremost a law enforcer. The making of law is not the
prototypical executive branch function.
While true as an abstract point, this question has little bearing on the
matters at hand. An attorney general would not promulgate regulations
based on inherent constitutional authority, but based on an express
delegation of administrative authority from the legislature. The state
legislatures could have tried to craft detailed statutes that specifically
defined unfairness.2 96 They explicitly chose not to do so and instead
empowered and directed the attorney general to develop unfairness law
through regulations.297
295 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 10, at 17. It is important to remember,
though, that prospective changes would only effect new gun purchases. With an estimated 70 million
handguns in circulation, it is unclear how long it would take for new standards to have a decisive
impact on the annual accidental injury rates. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUNS USED IN CRIME 2-3
(1995). However, there is some evidence that newer handguns are disproportionately involved in
certain types of handgun fatalities. See Stephen W. Hargarten et al., Characteristics of Firearms
Involved in Fatalities, 275 JAMA 42 (1996). If the trend holds true for accidental injuries, that may
indicate that much of the older existing stock either is not readily accessible in consumer homes or is
no longer functioning. That in turn would support claims that changes in standards for commercial
sales can have a large impact on a relatively short time horizon.
296 The legislatures could also have left the definition vague and relied upon case-by-case
adjudication to develop the meaning of unfairness. That UDAP states also rejected this alternative
shows their desire that the attorney general provide prospective guidance to industry regarding the
meaning of unfairness.
297 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 48-604 (1999); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 2(c) (West
1995); N.J. STAT. REV. § 56:8-4 (1989). As part of their police power role, several state legislatures
that have been able to overcome political obstacles have enacted safety standards for certain products
that fall through the safety net. In the case of handguns, several of these states opted for very specific
and detailed statutory standards. See CAL. PENAL CODE, §§ 12125-12133 (West 1999); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 134-15 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-18 (Law Co-op. 1976). However, these provisions
are criminal statutes, rather than consumer protection provisions. Thus, they provide a less flexible
and, in practice, a less enforceable remedy to state enforcement authorities. Moreover, those
legislatures with older statutes have not revisited the issues to adapt their requirements to industrial
innovations. For instance, South Carolina's statute requires that certain metal handgun parts be subject
to a melting-point test. While melting point serves as a cheap and simple surrogate for direct tests on
the strength and durability of metals commonly used in gun manufacture, the statute does not account
for industry developments that enable certain parts to be made of plastic resins. See J. GORDON, THE
NEW SCIENCE OF STRONG MATERIALS 229 (2d ed. 1976); VAN VLACK, supra note 288, at 263-74,
383-99. Any parts made of these resins simply evade the South Carolina tests. Similarly, inventive
manufacturers could experiment with alloy composition of their metal parts, in order to "tweek" the
melting point without having to really address the durability issue. See HANDBOOK OF CHEMISTRY
AND PHYSICS 12:159 (D. Linde ed., 1995); GORDON, supra, at 229; VAN VLACK, supra note 288, at
527-73; Wintemute, supra note 288, at 1752. Despite these problems, the South Carolina legislature
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This legislative decision is quite rational, given the expansive time
commitment required to write and update a specific business practices
statute. As noted in Part I, the federal consumer protection regimen has
followed this administrative route. It makes possible a more objective,
detailed, and flexible analysis of specific safety issues than could
practicably work their way into a detailed statute.298 It also ensures, in a
way that a legislature could not, that every interested party will have an
opportunity to contribute to the creation of a standard.
Legislatures could have chosen a more limited delegation of
authority,299 but instead they relied upon attorneys general to carry the
specifics into prospective standards. Given the statutory delegation, it
would be more like an abdication of responsibility, rather than a
demonstration of prudent deference, for an attorney general to resist this
UDAP role.
H. Whether This Is an Aggregation of Power Without Realistic Limits
Even assuming that the legislature did intend for the attorney general
to set prospective standards for unfairness, this does not mean it would be
necessarily prudent for an attorney general to use them to set product
standards. Unfairness law has developed to encompass matters never
specifically considered by legislatures at the time they enacted UDAP
statutes. °° Might a foray into these newly expanded areas, such as product
safety, cause a reaction from the legislatures? Might it lead to statutory
has not been able to revisit this issue and correct these problems. Even if it did, new problems would
likely arise that would require renewed attention. This may be why other states that have been able to
pass gun safety standards have delegated the task of setting standards to regulatory bodies. See, e.g.,
MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 36J (2000).
298 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 2052 (1994).
299 Some states did provide more limited delegations. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-394
(1999) (limiting regulatory authority to adopting FTC rules and allowing promulgation only in limited
circumstances). However, the fact that such language changes were not more widely attempted shows
that state legislatures were generally supportive of attorney general regulatory authority. The only
specific limitation on the regulatory authority widely adopted under UDAP law arises in areas where
another state agency has been given specific authority to approve certain types of conduct. See. e.g.,
IDAHO CODE § 48-605(1) (1999); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A, § 3 (West 1995). Courts have been
reluctant to expand these restrictions. See, e.g., Larsen v. Larsen, 656 A.2d 1009 (Conn. 1995) (finding
that UDAP laws have express exemptions); Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Co., 674 A.2d 582
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (finding that UDAP laws can apply with other statutes unless another
single forum is designed to address all industry issues); Dreier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 527 A.2d 875
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (explaining that the fact that the UCC governs an area does not block
UDAP laws). But see In re Prudential Ins. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 975 F. Supp. 584 (D.N.J.
1997) (holding that a suit based on UDAP laws was preempted by the state insurance scheme).
300 That does not mean that product safety was ignored, but that the area was relatively
nascent when UDAP laws were passed. Indeed, at that time, Congress had not even constructed the
current product safety net or created the CPSC. Later debates on unfairness did begin to touch on
product safety issues, at least at the federal level. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. However,
even these allusions to the issue did not take the center stage in congressional unfairness discussions.
The area was simply too new to warrant or expect a great deal of focus.
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amendments to cabin attorney general authority or otherwise reduce the
consumer protection purview of these statutes? In addition, given the
expansive nature of the current case law, is an attorney general faced with
a normative issue of whether it is even appropriate to utilize these powers?
While these questions are somewhat interesting, they do not really
apply in the current context. Although regulations in a given area may give
rise to political countermeasures, attorney general regulatory powers under
UDAP statutes are not practically so broad as to raise sustainable
legislative concern. They simply do not provide a picture of excess
authority that UDAP's enemies could exploit, nor do they present any true
normative issue for an attorney general. °1
Attorney general authority is practicably limited to the very products
that currently fall through the federal safety net. To begin with, federal
consumer product safety statutes, such as the Consumer Product Safety
Act, have specific preemption provisions that bar state action once federal
regulations address an issue.30 2 Moreover, while a wide variety of products
are not currently subject to these regulations, the mere possibility of action
by federal regulators is enough to discourage state regulations. State
administrative process requires an attorney general to undertake a lengthy,
expensive, and time-consuming hearing process before issuing product
standards.30 3 No attorney general will want invest that kind of time,
money, and effort only to have a federal agency pre-empt him before the
close of the process. 304 The very products that an attorney general will be
interested in addressing could well be ones that might eventually also
catch the attention of federal authorities. Indeed, the public attention that
an attorney general necessarily would draw when initiating a rulemaking
process would itself likely attract federal agencies to the issue. Thus, from
a practical standpoint, state UDAP regulation outside areas of federal
301 Legislators concerned that UDAP regulatory authority allows for too much product safety
decisionmaking outside the legislature should think twice before trying to cabin an attorney general's
regulatory powers. Such limitations would only encourage alternative methods of challenging industry,
such as post hoc UDAP and tort suits. While not particularly effective consumer protection tools, they
are in any event even less subject to legislative oversight than attorney general regulatory initiatives.
See supra Part I.C.2.
302 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2075(a) (1994); cf. Moe v. MTD Prods., 73 F.3d 179 (8th Cir.
1995) (holding that CPSC standards preempt state regulation-based and tort-based actions); State ex
rel. Jones Chemicals v. Seier, 871 S.W.2d 611 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the federal
Hazardous Substances Act preempts a tort claim on a similar subject).
303 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.05 (Anderson 1993) (all rules adopted per state
APA). See generally BONFIELD, supra note 263, at 156-439.
304 This "deterrent effect" on state attorneys general may be substantial, even if the federal
agency's relative inactivity has begun to erode its deterrent effect on manufacturers. While a
manufacturer's continued substandard production may not goad a somnolent federal agency into
setting standards, an imminent rulemaking by an attorney general, which would draw governmental
and public attention and, thereby, threaten to embarrass the federal agency by highlighting its
inactivity, might catalyze just such an outcome. Thus, an attorney general could well expect a federal
response even if manufacturers have tended to discount that possibility.
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exemption is somewhat improbable. A state attorney general is more likely
to lobby the federal agencies to take action in these circumstances in lieu
of taking on such a regulatory burden directly.
In addition, the same state hearing process that makes many
regulatory initiatives unpalatable also ensures that any resulting
regulations are well thought out and the product of meticulous review.
While an attorney general could initially commence a rule-making
proceeding with expansive regulatory goals, the result of hearing opposing
views at length and of compiling facts to support his finished regulations
will temper any such decisions. Moreover, the resultant regulatory
provisions are still subject to judicial review. 305 This requirement that the
regulations actually address issues of unfairness and do so in a reasonable
fashion is the lynchpin of administrative law. The critical role of the courts
ensures that regulations are appropr'iate and provides a very real barrier
against overreaching. UDAP regulatory experience already shows that
courts take this responsibility seriously. When courts believe regulations
go too far, they do not hesitate to remind the attorney general of the limits
of his authority.0 6
Finally, from a practical perspective, it is important to remember that
an attorney general generally is an elected official.307 Thus, any regulations
that an attorney general proposes may in any event be sensitive to the
public will. This obviates the need for the attorney general to pay special
attention to the risks posed to UDAP by such regulating; the attorney
general will be subjecting himself to the same risks and is not likely to step
into them either lightly or unprepared. Regulations under UDAP statutes,
therefore, will be reasoned, well-measured, and enacted only when a
demonstrable need arises.
I. Whether Federal Inaction Should Mean Inaction by the State Attorney
General
A final serious policy consideration is whether a state attorney
general should follow the lead of the federal government. One could view
the current exemptions in federal statutes and the fairly restrained hand of
the federal regulators as a conscious decision to have market forces set the
safety standards for many products. Should the states act despite this
federal decision not to intervene? UDAP statutes certainly stress that
305 See Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1980); Minnesota-
Dakotas Retail Hardware Ass'n v. State, 279 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Minn. 1979).
306 See Ran Dav's County Kosher, Inc. v. State, 608 A.2d 1353, 1360 (N.J. 1992); Christie v.
Dalmig, Inc., 396 A.2d 1385, 1387-88 (Vt. 1979).
307 But see TENN. CONST. art. VI, § 5 (establishing that the attorney general is appointed by
the Tennessee Supreme Court).
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application of the law should be guided by federal decisions and
administrative actions under the unfairness doctrine. °8 Thus, is it
appropriate for an attorney general to use UDAP powers to remedy
dangers that federal regulators have left untouched?
The short answer is simply "yes." While there may be legitimate
reasons to accept the product safety status quo, the need to defer to federal
decisions is not one of them. Federal silence, or even emphatic
determinations not to act in the product safety arena, does not countenance
state-level inaction for several reasons.
First, congressional or federal administrative determinations not to act
in an area may be just a decision that the matter is best left to the states.
Often, nonaction by federal authorities is simply a recognition of state
expertise or interest in an area. Indeed, an entire tier of the existing safety
net is based on the continued viability of state product liability tort law.30 9
Moreover, this preference for state regulation and action is reflected in the
preemption case law: unless Congress specifically bars state action, it is
presumed that the federal legislators intended the states to continue to
exercise their traditional police and regulatory powers.31°
Second, so long as a state attorney general has no constitutional
responsibility not to act,311 an attorney general's primary responsibility is
not to the preferences of Congress or federal regulators but to the state.
The views of the state legislature and high court must be an attorney
general's primary guide in determining his or her duties.31 2 The UDAP
statutes, which reflect these views, are very clear on the level of deference
to be provided to federal policy makers. UDAP development is not to be
constrained by federal limitations, although the development of unfairness
is to be "guided by" federal views of the term.31 3 This guidance is only
relevant to the extent that the state courts have not already set forth
boundaries for unfairness. Given that the UDAP state case law has already
indicated that the sale of sub-merchantable or unsafe products is "unfair,"
no "guidance" is needed.314
308 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-11Ob(b) (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-
391 (b) (1999).
309 See, e.g., Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 1298 (D. Minn. 1988);
Gorman v. Saf-T-Mate, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1028, 1035 (N.D. Ind. 1981).
310 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 518 (1992); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
311 If federal policy properly pre-empted state involvement, state attorneys general would be
bound to support the federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (Supremacy Clause).
312 Cf. T&W Chevrolet v. Darvial, 641 P.2d 1368 (Mont. 1982) (noting in dicta that a state
UDAP agency need not adopt FTC interpretations of unfairness; the state statute sets its own standards
for unfairness as interpreted by the courts); Hinds v. Paul's Auto Werkstatt, Inc., 810 P.2d 874, 875
(Or. Ct. App. 1991) ("[The] policy reasons that the FTC gave ... do not determine the construction of
[UDAP laws].").
313 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 lOb(b) (West 1997).
314 See. e.g., Purity Supreme, Inc. v. Attomey Gen., 407 N.E.2d 297, 309 (Mass. 1980);
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This view is further bolstered by the legislatures' directive to the
attorneys general regarding regulatory powers. As noted in Part II.C, these
powers are quite broad. The standard UDAP limitation relating to federal
law is that the regulations may not be "inconsistent" with federal strictures
on unfairness. 315 Case law interprets this UDAP provision as not barring
attorney general regulations unless there is an actual conflict between the
regulation and an existing federal requirement.316 Thus, legislatures
intended for attorneys general to act in areas where federal regulators or
Congress were silent.317 The fact that federal regulators have chosen not to
set standards for a product, or that federal law has exempted a product
from federal regulation, does not mean that an attorney general should
avoid these areas.318 The legislatures did not envision such a timid and
narrow role for the main enforcer of state consumer protection policy.
Absent a specific prohibition by Congress or authorized federal
regulators, 319 a state attorney general is free to protect state citizens from
threats of harm, including threats posed by dangerous products. Federal
silence on these issues does not provide a justification for avoiding this
responsibility.
IV. Practical Predecessors for UDAP Product Regulation
One additional question regarding this UDAP regulatory solution to
Vermont v. International Collection Serv., Inc., 594 A.2d 426, 432 (Vt. 1991) (noting that other courts
"have [not] felt constrained ... by the requirement to follow interpretations of the FTCA, although
[their statutes] contain such a requirement").
315 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-1 10b(c) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
501.205(2) (Harrison 1994); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453(c) (1993). But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1345.05 (Anderson 1993) ("In adopting regulations ... due consideration and great weight shall be
given to FTC orders .... ").
316 See, e.g., Kopischke v. First Continental Corp., 610 P.2d 668, 687 (Mont. 1980); Hinds v.
Paul's Auto Werkstatt, Inc., 810 P.2d 874, 875 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
317 See Normand Josef Enters. v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 646 A.2d 1289, 1302 (Conn.
1994) (holding that Connecticut can issue unfairness regulations in areas that the FTC has not
regulated and cannot regulate); Department of Legal Affairs v. Rogers, 329 So.2d 257, 267 (Fla. 1976)
(stating that FTC inaction with respect to conduct does not mean state regulations are precluded); Totz
v. Continental DuPage Acura, 602 N.E.2d 1374, 1381 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (arguing the fact that the
FTC used-car rule did not require affirmative disclosures does not mean Illinois consumer cannot
demand them under state statute); Kopischke, 610 P.2d at 687-88 (approving regulations because they
do not directly conflict with any FTC regulations). But cf IDAHO CODE § 48-618 (1999) (creating
defense for defendants that can show practices "are subject to and comply with statutes administered
by the FTC, or any duties, regulations or decisions interpreting such statutes").
318 Cf Raymer v. Bay State Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 515 (Mass. 1981); Dodd v. Commercial
Union Ins. Co., 365 N.E.2d 802 (Mass. 1977).
319 Vague federal policy statements are not enough to satisfy this requirement. See
International Collection, 594 A.2d at 430 (rejecting an earlier FTC position paper on unfairness
"ambiguously [expressed] in a letter, of uncertain legal effect, to two members of Congress. Whatever
the effect of the letter within the FTC, we are reluctant to view it as a definitive FTC interpretation of
the FTCA, as contemplated by our law"); see also American Fin. Servs. v. FTC, 767 F.2d 957, 971
(D.C. Cir. 1985); cf Sawash v. Suburban Welders Supply Co., 553 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Mass. 1990).
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the consumer product safety problem is whether state attorneys general are
ready for the challenge. This query does not address their substantive
expertise (discussed in Part III.D), but more the issue of procedural
competence. An attorney general regulating goods under a UDAP statute
must be able to write the standards properly, gather information according
to administrative procedures, and work the end product into the existing
consumer protection framework without unintended consequences. Given
the importance of safety standards, and the harm that can stem from doing
the job improperly, is it prudent for an attorney general to venture into this
arena at this time? Should an attorney general first hone his or her
regulatory skills in other, simpler areas?
The answer is that an attorney general likely has all the experience
needed. While the concept of promulgating JDAP regulations centered on
product safety standards is a novel one, the offices of many attorneys
general have substantial experience with promulgating consumer
regulations in other contexts. Even if a particular attorney general does not
have personal experience with any regulatory endeavors, the attorney
general's office will have an experienced staff with more of an
institutional memory. Moreover, an attorney general can seek assistance
from the offices of other attorneys general that have been through the
regulatory process many times.
Attorneys general have drafted, promulgated, defended, and
successfully implemented a broad variety of UDAP regulations during the
past twenty years.320 While these regulations have generally focused on
issues of disclosure and methods of solicitation,32' they nevertheless
involve the regulation of merchant conduct. The process for crafting and
enacting such provisions is very similar to the synthesis required to
promulgate product safety standards. In both arenas, it is necessary to
understand the harms facing consumers, the industry that is soliciting the
sales, the possible alternative ways that consumers can be provided with
goods, and the likely burden that potential remedies will place on industry.
Both types of regulation may require at least some technical understanding
of the products at issue and the patterns of use to which the products are
put. 32
2
320 The Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, for instance, has put into effect 11 sets of
UDAP regulations governing various types of commercial conduct and is currently shepherding a 12th
towards full implementation. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 3.00-16.00 (1999). A variety of
regulations have also been promulgated in other leading consumer protection states. See ILL. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 14, §§ 460, 470, 475 (2000); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 109:4-3 (1988); Wis. ADMIN. CODE §§
109-137 (2000).
321 See, e.g., CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 42-110b-18 (2000); IDAHO ADMIN. CODE §
04.02.01-30 (2000); CODE ME. R. § 26-239-100(3) (1999); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 2, § 01.01 (2000);
MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 15, § 60-4.030 (1999).
322 Without an understanding of the underlying product, it is not possible to know what
information is relevant and thus should be disclosed. Indeed, to the extent that the disclosures are
321
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Such experience is not limited to issues of disclosure. Many UDAP
regulations focus on substantive restrictions on seller behavior that go far
beyond providing consumers with information. From mobile home
communities 323 to mortgage broker practices, 324 attorneys general have
used UDAP statutes to establish specific standards governing how
professional sellers must act in the general marketplace.
Attorney general regulations governing the service industry provide a
close analogy to the types of product regulation suggested in this Article.
When UDAP regulations require that rustproofers treat certain relevant car
parts when they perform their services,3 25 that basement waterproofers
utilize only certain types of reliable methods,326 and that insulation
installers perform their job only in a certain fashion,327 these restrictions
protect consumers by barring the sale of defective services. Defective
services and defective goods both pose potential dangers to consumers,
and both types of dangers can be avoided if the seller takes reasonable care
in preparing what he is offering for sale.328 The nature and use of services
often makes them difficult to distinguish from products that do not have
physical shape and tangible form.329 An attorney general's regulation of
such items/services might in some eyes be considered more difficult than
the regulation of devices that one can feel and examine. It is simpler to see
the dangers of a handgun made of defective materials than to identify what
are acceptable risks for consumers participating in new mortgage loan
structures. Yet, mortgage loans, as well as broker behavior in selling them,
are the subject of UDAP regulatory oversight.33°
Perhaps even more to the point, some attorneys general have already
completed initial forays into the product regulation arena as part of their
comprehensive oversight of certain commercial activities and now have
some practical experience administering such provisions. This experience
should help guide them, as well as other attorneys general who are crafting
warnings of product-related hazards, the similarity is even more complete. See In re Harvester, 104
F.T.C. 949, 1064-67 (1984).
323 See Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 125.
324 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 8.00.
325 See CODE ME. R. § 26-239-105.6.
326 See WiS. ADMIN. CODE § 111.03(7).
327 See CODE ME. R. § 26-239-100.
328 For instance, attorneys general have regulated services where the products installed by
the service person may pose serious health risks if installed or handled improperly. See, e.g., CODE.
ME. R. § 26-239-100; OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 109:4-3-14 (1998); WiS. ADMIN. CODE § 136.10(1-9).
329 This issue can arise in very diverse contexts. See, e.g., Clint Smith, International Trade in
Television Programming and GA 7T. An Analysis of Why the European Community's Local Program
Requirement Violates the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 10 INT'L TAX & BUS. L. 97, 124
(1993) (noting that traditional economic distinctions may classify services as intangible products); Lori
Weber, Bad Bytes: The Application of Strict Products Liability to Computer Software, 66 ST. JOHN'S
L. REv. 469, 472 (1992) ("[B]ecause computer software contains both tangible and intangible
properties, its classification as either a good or a service is problematic.").
330 See. e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 8.00 (1999).
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regulations, in drafting even better provisions in the future.
While the regulations that include these product standards are more
generally focused on informational issues and other types of seller
conduct, they do set specific standards for commercial products.3"'
Defective meat 3 2 and "defective" pets33 are both governed by UDAP
regulations that are now in effect. Similarly, UDAP laws have been used to
enforce safety requirements regarding electricity and certain electrical
equipment. aa  The experience gleaned from such administrative
undertakings, which can be shared among attorneys general, no doubt
seasons these regulators for further regulatory work.335
Such regulations show that, even in initial attempts, UDAP enforcers
can make the shift from service regulation to product regulation without
difficulty. When challenged, the pet regulations were treated no differently
from any other UDAP regulations. The inclusion of specific product
standards in these mainly informational consumer protection regulations
raised no special issues for the reviewing court, and the UDAP regulations
336
were crafted well enough to survive review. Taking this as an example,
there is no reason that UDAP enforcers cannot craft and implement
regulations more fully focused on product characteristics. An attorney
general considering the "procedural competence" issue need not be overly
concerned. The attorney general's experience as an enforcer of UDAP
statutes combined with the broad range of UDAP regulatory experience
available as guidance provides sufficient preparation for this challenge.
331 The fact that attorneys general set such standards in the past, even if they did not
expressly do so based on their authority to regulate product characteristics under UDAP laws, supports
the idea that the development from informational and conduct requirements to product regulation is a
natural progression, and that it is a natural outgrowth of the regulatory efforts already undertaken by
attorneys general in consumer protection. Indeed, such specific standards are a perfect follow-up to
more generalized regulatory pronouncements on product issues. See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940,
§ 3.08(2) (stating generally that it is unfair to breach a warranty).
332 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 45, § 13:45A-3.1 (2000). New Jersey's regulations focus
on labeling standards, but also contain product standards, including that meat sold in New Jersey may
not exceed 30% fat. See id.
333 See N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 45, § 13:45A-12. New Jersey has comprehensive regulations
governing the sale of pets. Most relevant to the product characteristic inquiry is the regulation that
defines dogs and cats "unfit for purchase" if they suffer any "disease, deformity, injury, physical
condition, illness or defect which is congenital or hereditary and severely affects the health of the
animal." N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 45, § 13:45A-12.1. An animal that dies within 14 days of purchase is
automatically "unfit," entitling the consumer to a full refund. Id. § 13:45A-12.1 to .2.
334 See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 13-308 to -315 (1998) (prohibiting sale of electrical
products unless stamped as safe by a certified laboratory and attic fans without a "firestat or fusable
line").
335 See, e.g., N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 45, §§ 45A-12.1, 45A-3.10. In addition, defective
handgun regulations, while not yet fully implemented, have been promulgated in Massachusetts. See
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.00-.09; American Shooting Sports Council v. Attorney Gen., No. 98-
0203C (Ct., Jan. 13, 1998). For a more detailed discussion of American Shooting, see infra Conclusion.
336 See Pet Dealers Ass'n v. Division of Consumer Affairs, 373 A.2d 688, 689-90 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
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Conclusion
The inevitable progression of UDAP regulatory authority, from pure
disclosure issues, to guidance on minimum quality of services, to
occasional forays into product oversight as part of other overarching
regulatory structures, has placed many attorneys general on the brink of
straightforward product regulation. One leading state in the UDAP arena,
Massachusetts, has already taken a bold step in this direction.
In Massachusetts's Regulations on Handgun Sales, which addresses
"unfair and deceptive practices" engaged in by commercial "handgun
purveyors," a significant portion of the overarching regulatory structure
addresses minimum product standards.33 While many of the provisions in
this set of UDAP regulations are directed towards informational issues and
matters of sales techniques33 and some of the product standard provisions
simply mirror the Massachusetts criminal code,339 the regulations also
include a variety of product design criteria that set independent standards
for product safety.34 °
The handgun industry challenged these regulations on a variety of
grounds34' and successfully obtained a lower court injunction against the
portions of the regulations that set product standards. However, that
injunction was vacated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,342
and on remand the trial court declared the regulations valid earlier this
year.343 The Supreme Judicial Court's decision specifically held that the
337 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.00-.09 (1999).
338 See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.06 (requiring warnings, informational
disclosures, and explanations regarding handguns offered for sale).
339 Compare MASS. REGS. Code tit. 940, § 16.03 (stating that it is an unfair practice to sell
handguns without tamper resistant serial numbers in certain circumstances), with MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 269, § 1IE (stating that it is a criminal violation to make such sales). Other provisions of the
regulations also parallel state criminal strictures. See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.04 (stating
that it is an unfair practice to sell handguns that fail to meet certain minimum safety and quality
standards). Interestingly, though, versions of these regulatory sections preceded many of their criminal
counterparts. Compare Mass. Reg. 99 (Oct. 31, 1997) (promulgating regulations of handgun sales),
with 1998 Mass. Acts 180 (enacting similar criminal provisions in 1998).
340 See, e.g., MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.05(3) (stating that it is an unfair practice to
sell handguns without a load indicator or magazine safety disconnect in certain circumstances); id. §
16.05(2) (stating that it is an unfair practice to sell handguns without built-in childproofing devices).
341 Industry lawyers raised due process, interstate commerce, and other claims, including
claims that the regulatory standards were unreasonable, and that the attorney general lacked authority
to promulgate substantive standards. See Complaint, American Shooting Sports Council, Inc. v.
Attorney Gen., No. 98-0203, at % 33-50.
342 See American Shooting Sports Council, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., 711 N.E.2d 899 (Mass.
1999). The authors successfully defended the regulations before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court in this case.
343 See American Shooting Sports Council, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., Superior Court decision,
(Jan. 20, 2000). The trial court decision upheld all of the Massachusetts regulatory standards for new
handguns. However, the court also held that certain used gun standards could not be implemented
because a statute enacted after the regulations were promulgated pre-empted oversight of those specific
weapons.
324
Patching the Holes in the Consumer Product Safety Net
Massachusetts Attorney General had authority under the UDAP statute to
issue product standards in non-preempted product categories.344 Thus, the
UDAP case law now includes the first unequivocal decision by a higher
court on this matter. The issue of authority has now been addressed.
In the aftermath of the Massachusetts handgun regulation litigation,
states will no doubt begin to apply UDAP regulatory powers to address
product safety issues. Given the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
validation of the UDAP regulatory approach, it seems reasonable to
assume that emboldened attorneys general will take the example in hand
and issue free-standing product safety standards using their UDAP
powers.3 45 The pressing need to find a solution to the current product
safety crisis ensures that others will follow the Massachusetts lead. An
attorney general, using existing UDAP tools at his disposal, can and will
act to protect consumers by patching the product safety net.
344 See American Shooting, 711 N.E.2d at 902-03.
345 A more conservative approach would be to include certain select product standards as
part of an overarching regulatory framework. Such standards, to the extent they are necessary to
implement of a broader disclosure or sales technique-related regulatory regime, are defensible as
incidental to the larger regulatory purpose. Technically, the Massachusetts provisions are free-standing
product safety requirements. See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, § 16.08 (1999) (noting the severability of
each provision in the handgun sales regulations). However, they are in practice part of an overarching
structure aiso concerned with disclosures, otherwise unlawful behavior, and marketing practices in the
handgun industry.

